@inbook{9403, abstract = {Optimal decision making requires individuals to know their available options and to anticipate correctly what consequences these options have. In many social interactions, however, we refrain from gathering all relevant information, even if this information would help us make better decisions and is costless to obtain. This chapter examines several examples of “deliberate ignorance.” Two simple models are proposed to illustrate how ignorance can evolve among self-interested and payoff - maximizing individuals, and open problems are highlighted that lie ahead for future research to explore.}, author = {Schmid, Laura and Hilbe, Christian}, booktitle = {Deliberate Ignorance: Choosing Not To Know}, editor = {Hertwig, Ralph and Engel, Christoph}, isbn = {978-0-262-04559-9}, pages = {139--152}, publisher = {MIT Press}, title = {{The evolution of strategic ignorance in strategic interaction}}, volume = {29}, year = {2021}, }