---
_id: '8793'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study optimal election sequences for repeatedly selecting a (very) small
group of leaders among a set of participants (players) with publicly known unique
ids. In every time slot, every player has to select exactly one player that it
considers to be the current leader, oblivious to the selection of the other players,
but with the overarching goal of maximizing a given parameterized global (“social”)
payoff function in the limit. We consider a quite generic model, where the local
payoff achieved by a given player depends, weighted by some arbitrary but fixed
real parameter, on the number of different leaders chosen in a round, the number
of players that choose the given player as the leader, and whether the chosen
leader has changed w.r.t. the previous round or not. The social payoff can be
the maximum, average or minimum local payoff of the players. Possible applications
include quite diverse examples such as rotating coordinator-based distributed
algorithms and long-haul formation flying of social birds. Depending on the weights
and the particular social payoff, optimal sequences can be very different, from
simple round-robin where all players chose the same leader alternatingly every
time slot to very exotic patterns, where a small group of leaders (at most 2)
is elected in every time slot. Moreover, we study the question if and when a single
player would not benefit w.r.t. its local payoff when deviating from the given
optimal sequence, i.e., when our optimal sequences are Nash equilibria in the
restricted strategy space of oblivious strategies. As this is the case for many
parameterizations of our model, our results reveal that no punishment is needed
to make it rational for the players to optimize the social payoff.
acknowledgement: "We are grateful to Matthias Függer and Thomas Nowak for having raised
our interest in the problem studied in this paper.\r\nThis work has been supported
the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) projects S11405, S11407 (RiSE), and P28182 (ADynNet)."
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Zeiner, Martin
last_name: Zeiner
- first_name: Ulrich
full_name: Schmid, Ulrich
last_name: Schmid
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
citation:
ama: Zeiner M, Schmid U, Chatterjee K. Optimal strategies for selecting coordinators.
Discrete Applied Mathematics. 2021;289(1):392-415. doi:10.1016/j.dam.2020.10.022
apa: Zeiner, M., Schmid, U., & Chatterjee, K. (2021). Optimal strategies for
selecting coordinators. Discrete Applied Mathematics. Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2020.10.022
chicago: Zeiner, Martin, Ulrich Schmid, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Optimal Strategies
for Selecting Coordinators.” Discrete Applied Mathematics. Elsevier, 2021.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2020.10.022.
ieee: M. Zeiner, U. Schmid, and K. Chatterjee, “Optimal strategies for selecting
coordinators,” Discrete Applied Mathematics, vol. 289, no. 1. Elsevier,
pp. 392–415, 2021.
ista: Zeiner M, Schmid U, Chatterjee K. 2021. Optimal strategies for selecting coordinators.
Discrete Applied Mathematics. 289(1), 392–415.
mla: Zeiner, Martin, et al. “Optimal Strategies for Selecting Coordinators.” Discrete
Applied Mathematics, vol. 289, no. 1, Elsevier, 2021, pp. 392–415, doi:10.1016/j.dam.2020.10.022.
short: M. Zeiner, U. Schmid, K. Chatterjee, Discrete Applied Mathematics 289 (2021)
392–415.
date_created: 2020-11-22T23:01:26Z
date_published: 2021-01-31T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-08-04T11:12:41Z
day: '31'
ddc:
- '510'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1016/j.dam.2020.10.022
external_id:
isi:
- '000596823800035'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: f1039ff5a2d6ca116720efdb84ee9d5e
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2021-02-04T11:28:42Z
date_updated: 2021-02-04T11:28:42Z
file_id: '9089'
file_name: 2021_DiscreteApplMath_Zeiner.pdf
file_size: 652739
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2021-02-04T11:28:42Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 289'
isi: 1
issue: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 392-415
project:
- _id: 25F2ACDE-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S11402-N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 25863FF4-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S11407
name: Game Theory
publication: Discrete Applied Mathematics
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0166218X
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Optimal strategies for selecting coordinators
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: 4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8
volume: 289
year: '2021'
...