---
res:
bibo_abstract:
- 'In 2-player non-zero-sum games, Nash equilibria capture the options for rational
behavior if each player attempts to maximize her payoff. In contrast to classical
game theory, we consider lexicographic objectives: first, each player tries to
maximize her own payoff, and then, the player tries to minimize the opponent''s
payoff. Such objectives arise naturally in the verification of systems with multiple
components. There, instead of proving that each component satisfies its specification
no matter how the other components behave, it often suffices to prove that each
component satisfies its specification provided that the other components satisfy
their specifications. We say that a Nash equilibrium is secure if it is an equilibrium
with respect to the lexicographic objectives of both players. We prove that in
graph games with Borel objectives, which include the games that arise in verification,
there may be several Nash equilibria, but there is always a unique maximal payoff
profile of secure equilibria. We show how this equilibrium can be computed in
the case of omega-regular objectives, and we characterize the memory requirements
of strategies that achieve the equilibrium.@eng'
bibo_authorlist:
- foaf_Person:
foaf_givenName: Krishnendu
foaf_name: Krishnendu Chatterjee
foaf_surname: Chatterjee
foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- foaf_Person:
foaf_givenName: Thomas A
foaf_name: Thomas Henzinger
foaf_surname: Henzinger
foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=40876CD8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
orcid: 0000−0002−2985−7724
- foaf_Person:
foaf_givenName: Marcin
foaf_name: Jurdziński, Marcin
foaf_surname: Jurdziński
bibo_doi: 10.1109/LICS.2004.1319610
dct_date: 2004^xs_gYear
dct_publisher: IEEE@
dct_title: Games with secure equilibria@
...