Dodis, Yevgeniy; Pietrzak, Krzysztof ZIST Austria; Kiltz, Eike; Wichs, Daniel
Traditionally, symmetric-key message authentication codes (MACs) are easily built from pseudorandom functions (PRFs). In this work we propose a wide variety of other approaches to building efficient MACs, without going through a PRF first. In particular, unlike deterministic PRF-based MACs, where each message has a unique valid tag, we give a number of probabilistic MAC constructions from various other primitives/assumptions. Our main results are summarized as follows: We show several new probabilistic MAC constructions from a variety of general assumptions, including CCA-secure encryption, Hash Proof Systems and key-homomorphic weak PRFs. By instantiating these frameworks under concrete number theoretic assumptions, we get several schemes which are more efficient than just using a state-of-the-art PRF instantiation under the corresponding assumption. For probabilistic MACs, unlike deterministic ones, unforgeability against a chosen message attack (uf-cma ) alone does not imply security if the adversary can additionally make verification queries (uf-cmva ). We give an efficient generic transformation from any uf-cma secure MAC which is "message-hiding" into a uf-cmva secure MAC. This resolves the main open problem of Kiltz et al. from Eurocrypt'11; By using our transformation on their constructions, we get the first efficient MACs from the LPN assumption. While all our new MAC constructions immediately give efficient actively secure, two-round symmetric-key identification schemes, we also show a very simple, three-round actively secure identification protocol from any weak PRF. In particular, the resulting protocol is much more efficient than the trivial approach of building a regular PRF from a weak PRF. © 2012 International Association for Cryptologic Research.
Supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Starting Grant (259668-PSPC)
355 - 374
EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
2012-04-15 – 2012-04-19
Dodis Y, Pietrzak KZ, Kiltz E, Wichs D. Message authentication, revisited. In: Vol 7237. Springer; 2012:355-374. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22
Dodis, Y., Pietrzak, K. Z., Kiltz, E., & Wichs, D. (2012). Message authentication, revisited (Vol. 7237, pp. 355–374). Presented at the EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Cambridge, UK: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22
Dodis, Yevgeniy, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, Eike Kiltz, and Daniel Wichs. “Message Authentication, Revisited,” 7237:355–74. Springer, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22.
Y. Dodis, K. Z. Pietrzak, E. Kiltz, and D. Wichs, “Message authentication, revisited,” presented at the EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Cambridge, UK, 2012, vol. 7237, pp. 355–374.
Dodis Y, Pietrzak KZ, Kiltz E, Wichs D. 2012. Message authentication, revisited. EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, LNCS, vol. 7237. 355–374.
Dodis, Yevgeniy, et al. Message Authentication, Revisited. Vol. 7237, Springer, 2012, pp. 355–74, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22.
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