---
res:
bibo_abstract:
- 'Most cryptographic primitives such as encryption, authentication or secret sharing
require randomness. Usually one assumes that perfect randomness is available,
but those primitives might also be realized under weaker assumptions. In this
work we continue the study of building secure cryptographic primitives from imperfect
random sources initiated by Dodis and Spencer (FOCSâ€™02). Their main result shows
that there exists a (high-entropy) source of randomness allowing for perfect encryption
of a bit, and yet from which one cannot extract even a single weakly random bit,
separating encryption from extraction. Our main result separates encryption from
2-out-2 secret sharing (both in the information-theoretic and in the computational
settings): any source which can be used to achieve one-bit encryption also can
be used for 2-out-2 secret sharing of one bit, but the converse is false, even
for high-entropy sources. Therefore, possibility of extraction strictly implies
encryption, which in turn strictly implies 2-out-2 secret sharing.@eng'
bibo_authorlist:
- foaf_Person:
foaf_givenName: Yevgeniy
foaf_name: Dodis, Yevgeniy
foaf_surname: Dodis
- foaf_Person:
foaf_givenName: Krzysztof Z
foaf_name: Krzysztof Pietrzak
foaf_surname: Pietrzak
foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- foaf_Person:
foaf_givenName: Bartosz
foaf_name: Przydatek, Bartosz
foaf_surname: Przydatek
bibo_doi: 10.1007/11681878_31
bibo_volume: 3876
dct_date: 2006^xs_gYear
dct_publisher: Springer@
dct_title: Separating sources for encryption and secret sharing@
...