--- res: bibo_abstract: - We present an improved bound on the advantage of any q-query adversary at distinguishing between the CBC MAC over a random n-bit permutation and a random function outputting n bits. The result assumes that no message queried is a prefix of any other, as is the case when all messages to be MACed have the same length. We go on to give an improved analysis of the encrypted CBC MAC, where there is no restriction on queried messages. Letting m be the block length of the longest query, our bounds are about mq2/2n for the basic CBC MAC and mo(1)q2/2n for the encrypted CBC MAC, improving prior bounds of m2q2/2n. The new bounds translate into improved guarantees on the probability of forging these MACs.@eng bibo_authorlist: - foaf_Person: foaf_givenName: Mihir foaf_name: Bellare, Mihir foaf_surname: Bellare - foaf_Person: foaf_givenName: Krzysztof Z foaf_name: Krzysztof Pietrzak foaf_surname: Pietrzak foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654 - foaf_Person: foaf_givenName: Phillip foaf_name: Rogaway, Phillip foaf_surname: Rogaway bibo_doi: 10.1007/11535218_32 bibo_volume: 3621 dct_date: 2005^xs_gYear dct_publisher: Springer@ dct_title: Improved security analyses for CBC MACs@ ...