{"author":[{"first_name":"Dimitar","last_name":"Jetchev","full_name":"Jetchev, Dimitar"},{"first_name":"Krzysztof Z","id":"3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","last_name":"Pietrzak","full_name":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z","orcid":"0000-0002-9139-1654"}],"ddc":["004"],"type":"conference","year":"2014","date_created":"2018-12-11T11:56:29Z","month":"02","page":"566 - 590","date_updated":"2021-01-12T06:56:12Z","volume":8349,"title":"How to fake auxiliary input","_id":"2236","department":[{"_id":"KrPi"}],"file":[{"access_level":"open_access","checksum":"42960325c29dcd8d832edadcc3ce0045","file_size":313528,"date_updated":"2020-07-14T12:45:34Z","creator":"system","file_id":"5275","file_name":"IST-2016-681-v1+1_869_1_.pdf","relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","date_created":"2018-12-12T10:17:21Z"}],"intvolume":"      8349","has_accepted_license":"1","oa_version":"Submitted Version","oa":1,"editor":[{"first_name":"Yehuda","full_name":"Lindell, Yehuda","last_name":"Lindell"}],"publication_status":"published","date_published":"2014-02-01T00:00:00Z","publication_identifier":{"isbn":["978-364254241-1"]},"project":[{"grant_number":"259668","name":"Provable Security for Physical Cryptography","_id":"258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","call_identifier":"FP7"}],"main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1","url":"https://repository.ist.ac.at/id/eprint/681"}],"day":"01","status":"public","ec_funded":1,"alternative_title":["LNCS"],"pubrep_id":"681","quality_controlled":"1","user_id":"4435EBFC-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","file_date_updated":"2020-07-14T12:45:34Z","publist_id":"4725","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Consider a joint distribution (X,A) on a set. We show that for any family of distinguishers, there exists a simulator such that 1 no function in can distinguish (X,A) from (X,h(X)) with advantage ε, 2 h is only O(2 3ℓ ε -2) times less efficient than the functions in. For the most interesting settings of the parameters (in particular, the cryptographic case where X has superlogarithmic min-entropy, ε &gt; 0 is negligible and consists of circuits of polynomial size), we can make the simulator h deterministic. As an illustrative application of our theorem, we give a new security proof for the leakage-resilient stream-cipher from Eurocrypt'09. Our proof is simpler and quantitatively much better than the original proof using the dense model theorem, giving meaningful security guarantees if instantiated with a standard blockcipher like AES. Subsequent to this work, Chung, Lui and Pass gave an interactive variant of our main theorem, and used it to investigate weak notions of Zero-Knowledge. Vadhan and Zheng give a more constructive version of our theorem using their new uniform min-max theorem."}],"publisher":"Springer","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"conference":{"location":"San Diego, USA","start_date":"2014-02-24","name":"TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference","end_date":"2014-02-26"},"citation":{"ama":"Jetchev D, Pietrzak KZ. How to fake auxiliary input. In: Lindell Y, ed. Vol 8349. Springer; 2014:566-590. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24\">10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24</a>","ieee":"D. Jetchev and K. Z. Pietrzak, “How to fake auxiliary input,” presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, San Diego, USA, 2014, vol. 8349, pp. 566–590.","chicago":"Jetchev, Dimitar, and Krzysztof Z Pietrzak. “How to Fake Auxiliary Input.” edited by Yehuda Lindell, 8349:566–90. Springer, 2014. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24</a>.","mla":"Jetchev, Dimitar, and Krzysztof Z. Pietrzak. <i>How to Fake Auxiliary Input</i>. Edited by Yehuda Lindell, vol. 8349, Springer, 2014, pp. 566–90, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24\">10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24</a>.","ista":"Jetchev D, Pietrzak KZ. 2014. How to fake auxiliary input. TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, LNCS, vol. 8349, 566–590.","apa":"Jetchev, D., &#38; Pietrzak, K. Z. (2014). How to fake auxiliary input. In Y. Lindell (Ed.) (Vol. 8349, pp. 566–590). Presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, San Diego, USA: Springer. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24</a>","short":"D. Jetchev, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Y. Lindell (Ed.), Springer, 2014, pp. 566–590."},"doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24"}