Leakage resilient cryptography attempts to incorporate side-channel leakage into the black-box security model and designs cryptographic schemes that are provably secure within it. Informally, a scheme is leakage-resilient if it remains secure even if an adversary learns a bounded amount of arbitrary information about the schemes internal state. Unfortunately, most leakage resilient schemes are unnecessarily complicated in order to achieve strong provable security guarantees. As advocated by Yu et al. [CCS’10], this mostly is an artefact of the security proof and in practice much simpler construction may already suffice to protect against realistic side-channel attacks. In this paper, we show that indeed for simpler constructions leakage-resilience can be obtained when we aim for relaxed security notions where the leakage-functions and/or the inputs to the primitive are chosen non-adaptively. For example, we show that a three round Feistel network instantiated with a leakage resilient PRF yields a leakage resilient PRP if the inputs are chosen non-adaptively (This complements the result of Dodis and Pietrzak [CRYPTO’10] who show that if a adaptive queries are allowed, a superlogarithmic number of rounds is necessary.) We also show that a minor variation of the classical GGM construction gives a leakage resilient PRF if both, the leakage-function and the inputs, are chosen non-adaptively.
Conference proceedings CHES 2012
Sebastian Faust acknowledges support from the Danish National Research Foundation and The National Science Foundation of China (under the grant 61061130540) for the Sino-Danish Center for the Theory of Interactive Computation, within part of this work was performed; and from the CFEM research center, supported by the Danish Strategic Research Council. Supported by the European Research Council/ERC Starting Grant 259668-PSPC.
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CHES: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
2012-09-09 – 2012-09-12
Faust S, Pietrzak KZ, Schipper J. Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography. In: Conference Proceedings CHES 2012. Vol 7428. Springer; 2012:213-232. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13
Faust, S., Pietrzak, K. Z., & Schipper, J. (2012). Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography. In Conference proceedings CHES 2012 (Vol. 7428, pp. 213–232). Leuven, Belgium: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13
Faust, Sebastian, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Joachim Schipper. “Practical Leakage-Resilient Symmetric Cryptography.” In Conference Proceedings CHES 2012, 7428:213–32. Springer, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13.
S. Faust, K. Z. Pietrzak, and J. Schipper, “Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography,” in Conference proceedings CHES 2012, Leuven, Belgium, 2012, vol. 7428, pp. 213–232.
Faust S, Pietrzak KZ, Schipper J. 2012. Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography. Conference proceedings CHES 2012. CHES: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, LNCS, vol. 7428. 213–232.
Faust, Sebastian, et al. “Practical Leakage-Resilient Symmetric Cryptography.” Conference Proceedings CHES 2012, vol. 7428, Springer, 2012, pp. 213–32, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13.
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