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Doomsday equilibria for omega-regular games

Chatterjee K, Doyen L, Filiot E, Raskin J-F. 2014. Doomsday equilibria for omega-regular games. VMCAI 2014: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation. VMCAI: Verifcation, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation, LNCS, vol. 8318, 78–97.

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Author
Chatterjee, KrishnenduISTA ; Doyen, Laurent; Filiot, Emmanuel; Raskin, Jean-François
Department
Series Title
LNCS
Abstract
Two-player games on graphs provide the theoretical framework for many important problems such as reactive synthesis. While the traditional study of two-player zero-sum games has been extended to multi-player games with several notions of equilibria, they are decidable only for perfect-information games, whereas several applications require imperfect-information games. In this paper we propose a new notion of equilibria, called doomsday equilibria, which is a strategy profile such that all players satisfy their own objective, and if any coalition of players deviates and violates even one of the players objective, then the objective of every player is violated. We present algorithms and complexity results for deciding the existence of doomsday equilibria for various classes of ω-regular objectives, both for imperfect-information games, and for perfect-information games.We provide optimal complexity bounds for imperfect-information games, and in most cases for perfect-information games.
Publishing Year
Date Published
2014-01-30
Proceedings Title
VMCAI 2014: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation
Acknowledgement
Supported by Austrian Science Fund (FWF) Grant No P23499-N23, FWF NFN Grant No S11407-N23 (RiSE), ERC Start grant (279307: Graph Games), and Microsoft faculty fellows award.
Volume
8318
Page
78-97
Conference
VMCAI: Verifcation, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation
Conference Location
San Diego, CA, United States
Conference Date
2014-01-19 – 2014-01-21
ISSN
eISSN
IST-REx-ID

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Chatterjee K, Doyen L, Filiot E, Raskin J-F. Doomsday equilibria for omega-regular games. In: VMCAI 2014: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation. Vol 8318. Springer Nature; 2014:78-97. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-54013-4_5
Chatterjee, K., Doyen, L., Filiot, E., & Raskin, J.-F. (2014). Doomsday equilibria for omega-regular games. In VMCAI 2014: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation (Vol. 8318, pp. 78–97). San Diego, CA, United States: Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54013-4_5
Chatterjee, Krishnendu, Laurent Doyen, Emmanuel Filiot, and Jean-François Raskin. “Doomsday Equilibria for Omega-Regular Games.” In VMCAI 2014: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation, 8318:78–97. Springer Nature, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54013-4_5.
K. Chatterjee, L. Doyen, E. Filiot, and J.-F. Raskin, “Doomsday equilibria for omega-regular games,” in VMCAI 2014: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation, San Diego, CA, United States, 2014, vol. 8318, pp. 78–97.
Chatterjee K, Doyen L, Filiot E, Raskin J-F. 2014. Doomsday equilibria for omega-regular games. VMCAI 2014: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation. VMCAI: Verifcation, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation, LNCS, vol. 8318, 78–97.
Chatterjee, Krishnendu, et al. “Doomsday Equilibria for Omega-Regular Games.” VMCAI 2014: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation, vol. 8318, Springer Nature, 2014, pp. 78–97, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-54013-4_5.
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