---
_id: '14820'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We consider a natural problem dealing with weighted packet selection across
a rechargeable link, which e.g., finds applications in cryptocurrency networks.
The capacity of a link (u, v) is determined by how many nodes u and v allocate
for this link. Specifically, the input is a finite ordered sequence of packets
that arrive in both directions along a link. Given (u, v) and a packet of weight
x going from u to v, node u can either accept or reject the packet. If u accepts
the packet, the capacity on link (u, v) decreases by x. Correspondingly, v's capacity
on \r\n increases by x. If a node rejects the packet, this will entail a cost
affinely linear in the weight of the packet. A link is “rechargeable” in the sense
that the total capacity of the link has to remain constant, but the allocation
of capacity at the ends of the link can depend arbitrarily on the nodes' decisions.
The goal is to minimise the sum of the capacity injected into the link and the
cost of rejecting packets. We show that the problem is NP-hard, but can be approximated
efficiently with a ratio of (1+E) . (1+3) for some arbitrary E>0."
acknowledgement: We thank Mahsa Bastankhah and Mohammad Ali Maddah-Ali for fruitful
discussions about different variants of the problem. This work is supported by the
European Research Council (ERC) Consolidator Project 864228 (AdjustNet), 2020-2025,
the ERC CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt), and the German Research Foundation (DFG) grant
470029389 (FlexNets), 2021-2024.
article_number: '114353'
article_processing_charge: Yes (via OA deal)
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Schmid, Stefan
last_name: Schmid
- first_name: Jakub
full_name: Svoboda, Jakub
id: 130759D2-D7DD-11E9-87D2-DE0DE6697425
last_name: Svoboda
orcid: 0000-0002-1419-3267
- first_name: Michelle X
full_name: Yeo, Michelle X
id: 2D82B818-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Yeo
citation:
ama: 'Schmid S, Svoboda J, Yeo MX. Weighted packet selection for rechargeable links
in cryptocurrency networks: Complexity and approximation. Theoretical Computer
Science. 2024;989. doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114353'
apa: 'Schmid, S., Svoboda, J., & Yeo, M. X. (2024). Weighted packet selection
for rechargeable links in cryptocurrency networks: Complexity and approximation.
Theoretical Computer Science. Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114353'
chicago: 'Schmid, Stefan, Jakub Svoboda, and Michelle X Yeo. “Weighted Packet Selection
for Rechargeable Links in Cryptocurrency Networks: Complexity and Approximation.”
Theoretical Computer Science. Elsevier, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114353.'
ieee: 'S. Schmid, J. Svoboda, and M. X. Yeo, “Weighted packet selection for rechargeable
links in cryptocurrency networks: Complexity and approximation,” Theoretical
Computer Science, vol. 989. Elsevier, 2024.'
ista: 'Schmid S, Svoboda J, Yeo MX. 2024. Weighted packet selection for rechargeable
links in cryptocurrency networks: Complexity and approximation. Theoretical Computer
Science. 989, 114353.'
mla: 'Schmid, Stefan, et al. “Weighted Packet Selection for Rechargeable Links in
Cryptocurrency Networks: Complexity and Approximation.” Theoretical Computer
Science, vol. 989, 114353, Elsevier, 2024, doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114353.'
short: S. Schmid, J. Svoboda, M.X. Yeo, Theoretical Computer Science 989 (2024).
date_created: 2024-01-16T13:40:41Z
date_published: 2024-01-11T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2024-01-17T09:23:03Z
day: '11'
department:
- _id: KrCh
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114353
ec_funded: 1
intvolume: ' 989'
keyword:
- General Computer Science
- Theoretical Computer Science
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114353
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
publication: Theoretical Computer Science
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0304-3975
publication_status: epub_ahead
publisher: Elsevier
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'Weighted packet selection for rechargeable links in cryptocurrency networks:
Complexity and approximation'
type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 989
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '15007'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Traditional blockchains grant the miner of a block full control not only over
which transactions but also their order. This constitutes a major flaw discovered
with the introduction of decentralized finance and allows miners to perform MEV
attacks. In this paper, we address the issue of sandwich attacks by providing
a construction that takes as input a blockchain protocol and outputs a new blockchain
protocol with the same security but in which sandwich attacks are not profitable.
Furthermore, our protocol is fully decentralized with no trusted third parties
or heavy cryptography primitives and carries a linear increase in latency and
minimum computation overhead.
acknowledgement: "We would like to thank Krzysztof Pietrzak and Jovana Mićić for useful
discussions. This work has been funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation
(SNSF) under grant agreement Nr. 200021_188443 (Advanced Consensus Protocols).\r\n"
alternative_title:
- LIPIcs
article_number: '12'
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Orestis
full_name: Alpos, Orestis
last_name: Alpos
- first_name: Ignacio
full_name: Amores-Sesar, Ignacio
last_name: Amores-Sesar
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Cachin, Christian
last_name: Cachin
- first_name: Michelle X
full_name: Yeo, Michelle X
id: 2D82B818-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Yeo
citation:
ama: 'Alpos O, Amores-Sesar I, Cachin C, Yeo MX. Eating sandwiches: Modular and
lightweight elimination of transaction reordering attacks. In: 27th International
Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems. Vol 286. Schloss Dagstuhl
- Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik; 2024. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12'
apa: 'Alpos, O., Amores-Sesar, I., Cachin, C., & Yeo, M. X. (2024). Eating sandwiches:
Modular and lightweight elimination of transaction reordering attacks. In 27th
International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (Vol. 286).
Tokyo, Japan: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12'
chicago: 'Alpos, Orestis, Ignacio Amores-Sesar, Christian Cachin, and Michelle X
Yeo. “Eating Sandwiches: Modular and Lightweight Elimination of Transaction Reordering
Attacks.” In 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems,
Vol. 286. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2024. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12.'
ieee: 'O. Alpos, I. Amores-Sesar, C. Cachin, and M. X. Yeo, “Eating sandwiches:
Modular and lightweight elimination of transaction reordering attacks,” in 27th
International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, Tokyo, Japan,
2024, vol. 286.'
ista: 'Alpos O, Amores-Sesar I, Cachin C, Yeo MX. 2024. Eating sandwiches: Modular
and lightweight elimination of transaction reordering attacks. 27th International
Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems. OPODIS: Conference on Principles
of Distributed Systems, LIPIcs, vol. 286, 12.'
mla: 'Alpos, Orestis, et al. “Eating Sandwiches: Modular and Lightweight Elimination
of Transaction Reordering Attacks.” 27th International Conference on Principles
of Distributed Systems, vol. 286, 12, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für
Informatik, 2024, doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12.'
short: O. Alpos, I. Amores-Sesar, C. Cachin, M.X. Yeo, in:, 27th International Conference
on Principles of Distributed Systems, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik,
2024.
conference:
end_date: 2023-12-08
location: Tokyo, Japan
name: 'OPODIS: Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems'
start_date: 2023-12-06
date_created: 2024-02-18T23:01:02Z
date_published: 2024-01-18T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2024-02-26T10:18:18Z
day: '18'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12
external_id:
arxiv:
- '2307.02954'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 2993e810a45e8c8056106834b07aea92
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2024-02-26T10:16:57Z
date_updated: 2024-02-26T10:16:57Z
file_id: '15031'
file_name: 2024_LIPICs_Alpos.pdf
file_size: 1505994
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2024-02-26T10:16:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 286'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
publication: 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- '9783959773089'
issn:
- 1868-8969
publication_status: published
publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: 'Eating sandwiches: Modular and lightweight elimination of transaction reordering
attacks'
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 286
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '13143'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "GIMPS and PrimeGrid are large-scale distributed projects dedicated to searching
giant prime numbers, usually of special forms like Mersenne and Proth primes.
The numbers in the current search-space are millions of digits large and the participating
volunteers need to run resource-consuming primality tests. Once a candidate prime
N has been found, the only way for another party to independently verify the primality
of N used to be by repeating the expensive primality test. To avoid the need for
second recomputation of each primality test, these projects have recently adopted
certifying mechanisms that enable efficient verification of performed tests. However,
the mechanisms presently in place only detect benign errors and there is no guarantee
against adversarial behavior: a malicious volunteer can mislead the project to
reject a giant prime as being non-prime.\r\nIn this paper, we propose a practical,
cryptographically-sound mechanism for certifying the non-primality of Proth numbers.
That is, a volunteer can – parallel to running the primality test for N – generate
an efficiently verifiable proof at a little extra cost certifying that N is not
prime. The interactive protocol has statistical soundness and can be made non-interactive
using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.\r\nOur approach is based on a cryptographic primitive
called Proof of Exponentiation (PoE) which, for a group G, certifies that a tuple
(x,y,T)∈G2×N satisfies x2T=y (Pietrzak, ITCS 2019 and Wesolowski, J. Cryptol.
2020). In particular, we show how to adapt Pietrzak’s PoE at a moderate additional
cost to make it a cryptographically-sound certificate of non-primality."
acknowledgement: 'We are grateful to Pavel Atnashev for clarifying via e-mail several
aspects of the primality tests implementated in the PrimeGrid project. Pavel Hubáček
is supported by the Czech Academy of Sciences (RVO 67985840), the Grant Agency of
the Czech Republic under the grant agreement no. 19-27871X, and by the Charles University
project UNCE/SCI/004. Chethan Kamath is supported by Azrieli International Postdoctoral
Fellowship, ISF grants 484/18 and 1789/19, and ERC StG project SPP: Secrecy Preserving
Proofs.'
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Charlotte
full_name: Hoffmann, Charlotte
id: 0f78d746-dc7d-11ea-9b2f-83f92091afe7
last_name: Hoffmann
- first_name: Pavel
full_name: Hubáček, Pavel
last_name: Hubáček
- first_name: Chethan
full_name: Kamath, Chethan
last_name: Kamath
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
ama: 'Hoffmann C, Hubáček P, Kamath C, Pietrzak KZ. Certifying giant nonprimes.
In: Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2023. Vol 13940. Springer Nature; 2023:530-553.
doi:10.1007/978-3-031-31368-4_19'
apa: 'Hoffmann, C., Hubáček, P., Kamath, C., & Pietrzak, K. Z. (2023). Certifying
giant nonprimes. In Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2023 (Vol. 13940, pp.
530–553). Atlanta, GA, United States: Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31368-4_19'
chicago: Hoffmann, Charlotte, Pavel Hubáček, Chethan Kamath, and Krzysztof Z Pietrzak.
“Certifying Giant Nonprimes.” In Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2023, 13940:530–53.
Springer Nature, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31368-4_19.
ieee: C. Hoffmann, P. Hubáček, C. Kamath, and K. Z. Pietrzak, “Certifying giant
nonprimes,” in Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2023, Atlanta, GA, United
States, 2023, vol. 13940, pp. 530–553.
ista: 'Hoffmann C, Hubáček P, Kamath C, Pietrzak KZ. 2023. Certifying giant nonprimes.
Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2023. PKC: Public-Key Cryptography, LNCS, vol. 13940,
530–553.'
mla: Hoffmann, Charlotte, et al. “Certifying Giant Nonprimes.” Public-Key Cryptography
- PKC 2023, vol. 13940, Springer Nature, 2023, pp. 530–53, doi:10.1007/978-3-031-31368-4_19.
short: C. Hoffmann, P. Hubáček, C. Kamath, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Public-Key Cryptography
- PKC 2023, Springer Nature, 2023, pp. 530–553.
conference:
end_date: 2023-05-10
location: Atlanta, GA, United States
name: 'PKC: Public-Key Cryptography'
start_date: 2023-05-07
date_created: 2023-06-18T22:00:47Z
date_published: 2023-05-02T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-06-19T08:03:37Z
day: '02'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-31368-4_19
intvolume: ' 13940'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/238
month: '05'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 530-553
publication: Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2023
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1611-3349
isbn:
- '9783031313677'
issn:
- 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Certifying giant nonprimes
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 13940
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '12164'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'A shared-memory counter is a widely-used and well-studied concurrent object.
It supports two operations: An Inc operation that increases its value by 1 and
a Read operation that returns its current value. In Jayanti et al (SIAM J Comput,
30(2), 2000), Jayanti, Tan and Toueg proved a linear lower bound on the worst-case
step complexity of obstruction-free implementations, from read-write registers,
of a large class of shared objects that includes counters. The lower bound leaves
open the question of finding counter implementations with sub-linear amortized
step complexity. In this work, we address this gap. We show that n-process, wait-free
and linearizable counters can be implemented from read-write registers with O(log2n)
amortized step complexity. This is the first counter algorithm from read-write
registers that provides sub-linear amortized step complexity in executions of
arbitrary length. Since a logarithmic lower bound on the amortized step complexity
of obstruction-free counter implementations exists, our upper bound is within
a logarithmic factor of the optimal. The worst-case step complexity of the construction
remains linear, which is optimal. This is obtained thanks to a new max register
construction with O(logn) amortized step complexity in executions of arbitrary
length in which the value stored in the register does not grow too quickly. We
then leverage an existing counter algorithm by Aspnes, Attiya and Censor-Hillel
[1] in which we “plug” our max register implementation to show that it remains
linearizable while achieving O(log2n) amortized step complexity.'
acknowledgement: A preliminary version of this work appeared in DISC’19. Mirza Ahad
Baig, Alessia Milani and Corentin Travers are supported by ANR projects Descartes
and FREDDA. Mirza Ahad Baig is supported by UMI Relax. Danny Hendler is supported
by the Israel Science Foundation (Grants 380/18 and 1425/22).
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Mirza Ahad
full_name: Baig, Mirza Ahad
id: 3EDE6DE4-AA5A-11E9-986D-341CE6697425
last_name: Baig
- first_name: Danny
full_name: Hendler, Danny
last_name: Hendler
- first_name: Alessia
full_name: Milani, Alessia
last_name: Milani
- first_name: Corentin
full_name: Travers, Corentin
last_name: Travers
citation:
ama: Baig MA, Hendler D, Milani A, Travers C. Long-lived counters with polylogarithmic
amortized step complexity. Distributed Computing. 2023;36:29-43. doi:10.1007/s00446-022-00439-5
apa: Baig, M. A., Hendler, D., Milani, A., & Travers, C. (2023). Long-lived
counters with polylogarithmic amortized step complexity. Distributed Computing.
Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00446-022-00439-5
chicago: Baig, Mirza Ahad, Danny Hendler, Alessia Milani, and Corentin Travers.
“Long-Lived Counters with Polylogarithmic Amortized Step Complexity.” Distributed
Computing. Springer Nature, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00446-022-00439-5.
ieee: M. A. Baig, D. Hendler, A. Milani, and C. Travers, “Long-lived counters with
polylogarithmic amortized step complexity,” Distributed Computing, vol.
36. Springer Nature, pp. 29–43, 2023.
ista: Baig MA, Hendler D, Milani A, Travers C. 2023. Long-lived counters with polylogarithmic
amortized step complexity. Distributed Computing. 36, 29–43.
mla: Baig, Mirza Ahad, et al. “Long-Lived Counters with Polylogarithmic Amortized
Step Complexity.” Distributed Computing, vol. 36, Springer Nature, 2023,
pp. 29–43, doi:10.1007/s00446-022-00439-5.
short: M.A. Baig, D. Hendler, A. Milani, C. Travers, Distributed Computing 36 (2023)
29–43.
date_created: 2023-01-12T12:10:08Z
date_published: 2023-03-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-08-16T08:39:36Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/s00446-022-00439-5
external_id:
isi:
- '000890138700001'
intvolume: ' 36'
isi: 1
keyword:
- Computational Theory and Mathematics
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Hardware and Architecture
- Theoretical Computer Science
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2019/11310/
month: '03'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 29-43
publication: Distributed Computing
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1432-0452
issn:
- 0178-2770
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Long-lived counters with polylogarithmic amortized step complexity
type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 36
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '14428'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Suppose we have two hash functions h1 and h2, but we trust the security of
only one of them. To mitigate this worry, we wish to build a hash combiner Ch1,h2
which is secure so long as one of the underlying hash functions is. This question
has been well-studied in the regime of collision resistance. In this case, concatenating
the two hash function outputs clearly works. Unfortunately, a long series of works
(Boneh and Boyen, CRYPTO’06; Pietrzak, Eurocrypt’07; Pietrzak, CRYPTO’08) showed
no (noticeably) shorter combiner for collision resistance is possible.\r\nIn this
work, we revisit this pessimistic state of affairs, motivated by the observation
that collision-resistance is insufficient for many interesting applications of
cryptographic hash functions anyway. We argue the right formulation of the “hash
combiner” is to build what we call random oracle (RO) combiners, utilizing stronger
assumptions for stronger constructions.\r\nIndeed, we circumvent the previous
lower bounds for collision resistance by constructing a simple length-preserving
RO combiner C˜h1,h2Z1,Z2(M)=h1(M,Z1)⊕h2(M,Z2),where Z1,Z2\r\n are random salts
of appropriate length. We show that this extra randomness is necessary for RO
combiners, and indeed our construction is somewhat tight with this lower bound.\r\nOn
the negative side, we show that one cannot generically apply the composition theorem
to further replace “monolithic” hash functions h1 and h2 by some simpler indifferentiable
construction (such as the Merkle-Damgård transformation) from smaller components,
such as fixed-length compression functions. Finally, despite this issue, we directly
prove collision resistance of the Merkle-Damgård variant of our combiner, where
h1 and h2 are replaced by iterative Merkle-Damgård hashes applied to a fixed-length
compression function. Thus, we can still subvert the concatenation barrier for
collision-resistance combiners while utilizing practically small fixed-length
components underneath."
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Yevgeniy
full_name: Dodis, Yevgeniy
last_name: Dodis
- first_name: Niels
full_name: Ferguson, Niels
last_name: Ferguson
- first_name: Eli
full_name: Goldin, Eli
last_name: Goldin
- first_name: Peter
full_name: Hall, Peter
last_name: Hall
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
ama: 'Dodis Y, Ferguson N, Goldin E, Hall P, Pietrzak KZ. Random oracle combiners:
Breaking the concatenation barrier for collision-resistance. In: 43rd Annual
International Cryptology Conference. Vol 14082. Springer Nature; 2023:514-546.
doi:10.1007/978-3-031-38545-2_17'
apa: 'Dodis, Y., Ferguson, N., Goldin, E., Hall, P., & Pietrzak, K. Z. (2023).
Random oracle combiners: Breaking the concatenation barrier for collision-resistance.
In 43rd Annual International Cryptology Conference (Vol. 14082, pp. 514–546).
Santa Barbara, CA, United States: Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38545-2_17'
chicago: 'Dodis, Yevgeniy, Niels Ferguson, Eli Goldin, Peter Hall, and Krzysztof
Z Pietrzak. “Random Oracle Combiners: Breaking the Concatenation Barrier for Collision-Resistance.”
In 43rd Annual International Cryptology Conference, 14082:514–46. Springer
Nature, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38545-2_17.'
ieee: 'Y. Dodis, N. Ferguson, E. Goldin, P. Hall, and K. Z. Pietrzak, “Random oracle
combiners: Breaking the concatenation barrier for collision-resistance,” in 43rd
Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, United States,
2023, vol. 14082, pp. 514–546.'
ista: 'Dodis Y, Ferguson N, Goldin E, Hall P, Pietrzak KZ. 2023. Random oracle combiners:
Breaking the concatenation barrier for collision-resistance. 43rd Annual International
Cryptology Conference. CRYPTO: Advances in Cryptology, LNCS, vol. 14082, 514–546.'
mla: 'Dodis, Yevgeniy, et al. “Random Oracle Combiners: Breaking the Concatenation
Barrier for Collision-Resistance.” 43rd Annual International Cryptology Conference,
vol. 14082, Springer Nature, 2023, pp. 514–46, doi:10.1007/978-3-031-38545-2_17.'
short: Y. Dodis, N. Ferguson, E. Goldin, P. Hall, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, 43rd Annual
International Cryptology Conference, Springer Nature, 2023, pp. 514–546.
conference:
end_date: 2023-08-24
location: Santa Barbara, CA, United States
name: 'CRYPTO: Advances in Cryptology'
start_date: 2023-08-20
date_created: 2023-10-15T22:01:11Z
date_published: 2023-08-09T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-10-16T08:02:11Z
day: '09'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-38545-2_17
intvolume: ' 14082'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1041
month: '08'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 514-546
publication: 43rd Annual International Cryptology Conference
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1611-3349
isbn:
- '9783031385445'
issn:
- 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: 'Random oracle combiners: Breaking the concatenation barrier for collision-resistance'
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 14082
year: '2023'
...