@inproceedings{3279,
abstract = {We show a hardness-preserving construction of a PRF from any length doubling PRG which improves upon known constructions whenever we can put a non-trivial upper bound q on the number of queries to the PRF. Our construction requires only O(logq) invocations to the underlying PRG with each query. In comparison, the number of invocations by the best previous hardness-preserving construction (GGM using Levin's trick) is logarithmic in the hardness of the PRG. For example, starting from an exponentially secure PRG {0,1} n → {0,1} 2n, we get a PRF which is exponentially secure if queried at most q = exp(√n)times and where each invocation of the PRF requires Θ(√n) queries to the underlying PRG. This is much less than the Θ(n) required by known constructions.
},
author = {Jain, Abhishek and Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z and Tentes, Aris},
location = {Taormina, Sicily, Italy},
pages = {369 -- 382},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Hardness preserving constructions of pseudorandom functions}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21},
volume = {7194},
year = {2012},
}
@inproceedings{3280,
abstract = {The (decisional) learning with errors problem (LWE) asks to distinguish "noisy" inner products of a secret vector with random vectors from uniform. The learning parities with noise problem (LPN) is the special case where the elements of the vectors are bits. In recent years, the LWE and LPN problems have found many applications in cryptography. In this paper we introduce a (seemingly) much stronger adaptive assumption, called "subspace LWE" (SLWE), where the adversary can learn the inner product of the secret and random vectors after they were projected into an adaptively and adversarially chosen subspace. We prove that, surprisingly, the SLWE problem mapping into subspaces of dimension d is almost as hard as LWE using secrets of length d (the other direction is trivial.) This result immediately implies that several existing cryptosystems whose security is based on the hardness of the LWE/LPN problems are provably secure in a much stronger sense than anticipated. As an illustrative example we show that the standard way of using LPN for symmetric CPA secure encryption is even secure against a very powerful class of related key attacks. },
author = {Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z},
location = {Taormina, Sicily, Italy},
pages = {548 -- 563},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Subspace LWE}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31},
volume = {7194},
year = {2012},
}
@inproceedings{3281,
abstract = {We consider the problem of amplifying the "lossiness" of functions. We say that an oracle circuit C*: {0,1} m → {0,1}* amplifies relative lossiness from ℓ/n to L/m if for every function f:{0,1} n → {0,1} n it holds that 1 If f is injective then so is C f. 2 If f has image size of at most 2 n-ℓ, then C f has image size at most 2 m-L. The question is whether such C* exists for L/m ≫ ℓ/n. This problem arises naturally in the context of cryptographic "lossy functions," where the relative lossiness is the key parameter. We show that for every circuit C* that makes at most t queries to f, the relative lossiness of C f is at most L/m ≤ ℓ/n + O(log t)/n. In particular, no black-box method making a polynomial t = poly(n) number of queries can amplify relative lossiness by more than an O(logn)/n additive term. We show that this is tight by giving a simple construction (cascading with some randomization) that achieves such amplification.},
author = {Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z and Rosen, Alon and Segev, Gil},
location = {Taormina, Sicily, Italy},
pages = {458 -- 475},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Lossy functions do not amplify well}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26},
volume = {7194},
year = {2012},
}
@inproceedings{3282,
abstract = {Traditionally, symmetric-key message authentication codes (MACs) are easily built from pseudorandom functions (PRFs). In this work we propose a wide variety of other approaches to building efficient MACs, without going through a PRF first. In particular, unlike deterministic PRF-based MACs, where each message has a unique valid tag, we give a number of probabilistic MAC constructions from various other primitives/assumptions. Our main results are summarized as follows: We show several new probabilistic MAC constructions from a variety of general assumptions, including CCA-secure encryption, Hash Proof Systems and key-homomorphic weak PRFs. By instantiating these frameworks under concrete number theoretic assumptions, we get several schemes which are more efficient than just using a state-of-the-art PRF instantiation under the corresponding assumption. For probabilistic MACs, unlike deterministic ones, unforgeability against a chosen message attack (uf-cma ) alone does not imply security if the adversary can additionally make verification queries (uf-cmva ). We give an efficient generic transformation from any uf-cma secure MAC which is "message-hiding" into a uf-cmva secure MAC. This resolves the main open problem of Kiltz et al. from Eurocrypt'11; By using our transformation on their constructions, we get the first efficient MACs from the LPN assumption. While all our new MAC constructions immediately give efficient actively secure, two-round symmetric-key identification schemes, we also show a very simple, three-round actively secure identification protocol from any weak PRF. In particular, the resulting protocol is much more efficient than the trivial approach of building a regular PRF from a weak PRF. © 2012 International Association for Cryptologic Research.},
author = {Dodis, Yevgeniy and Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z and Kiltz, Eike and Wichs, Daniel},
location = {Cambridge, UK},
pages = {355 -- 374},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Message authentication, revisited}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22},
volume = {7237},
year = {2012},
}