TY - JOUR AB - We consider a natural problem dealing with weighted packet selection across a rechargeable link, which e.g., finds applications in cryptocurrency networks. The capacity of a link (u, v) is determined by how many nodes u and v allocate for this link. Specifically, the input is a finite ordered sequence of packets that arrive in both directions along a link. Given (u, v) and a packet of weight x going from u to v, node u can either accept or reject the packet. If u accepts the packet, the capacity on link (u, v) decreases by x. Correspondingly, v's capacity on increases by x. If a node rejects the packet, this will entail a cost affinely linear in the weight of the packet. A link is “rechargeable” in the sense that the total capacity of the link has to remain constant, but the allocation of capacity at the ends of the link can depend arbitrarily on the nodes' decisions. The goal is to minimise the sum of the capacity injected into the link and the cost of rejecting packets. We show that the problem is NP-hard, but can be approximated efficiently with a ratio of (1+E) . (1+3) for some arbitrary E>0. AU - Schmid, Stefan AU - Svoboda, Jakub AU - Yeo, Michelle X ID - 14820 JF - Theoretical Computer Science KW - General Computer Science KW - Theoretical Computer Science SN - 0304-3975 TI - Weighted packet selection for rechargeable links in cryptocurrency networks: Complexity and approximation VL - 989 ER - TY - CONF AB - Graphical games are a useful framework for modeling the interactions of (selfish) agents who are connected via an underlying topology and whose behaviors influence each other. They have wide applications ranging from computer science to economics and biology. Yet, even though an agent’s payoff only depends on the actions of their direct neighbors in graphical games, computing the Nash equilibria and making statements about the convergence time of "natural" local dynamics in particular can be highly challenging. In this work, we present a novel approach for classifying complexity of Nash equilibria in graphical games by establishing a connection to local graph algorithms, a subfield of distributed computing. In particular, we make the observation that the equilibria of graphical games are equivalent to locally verifiable labelings (LVL) in graphs; vertex labelings which are verifiable with constant-round local algorithms. This connection allows us to derive novel lower bounds on the convergence time to equilibrium of best-response dynamics in graphical games. Since we establish that distributed convergence can sometimes be provably slow, we also introduce and give bounds on an intuitive notion of "time-constrained" inefficiency of best responses. We exemplify how our results can be used in the implementation of mechanisms that ensure convergence of best responses to a Nash equilibrium. Our results thus also give insight into the convergence of strategy-proof algorithms for graphical games, which is still not well understood. AU - Hirvonen, Juho AU - Schmid, Laura AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Schmid, Stefan ID - 15006 SN - 18688969 T2 - 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems TI - On the convergence time in graphical games: A locality-sensitive approach VL - 286 ER - TY - JOUR AB - Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for cooperation in social dilemmas. The very logic of reciprocity, however, seems to require that individuals are symmetric, and that everyone has the same means to influence each others’ payoffs. Yet in many applications, individuals are asymmetric. Herein, we study the effect of asymmetry in linear public good games. Individuals may differ in their endowments (their ability to contribute to a public good) and in their productivities (how effective their contributions are). Given the individuals’ productivities, we ask which allocation of endowments is optimal for cooperation. To this end, we consider two notions of optimality. The first notion focuses on the resilience of cooperation. The respective endowment distribution ensures that full cooperation is feasible even under the most adverse conditions. The second notion focuses on efficiency. The corresponding endowment distribution maximizes group welfare. Using analytical methods, we fully characterize these two endowment distributions. This analysis reveals that both optimality notions favor some endowment inequality: More productive players ought to get higher endowments. Yet the two notions disagree on how unequal endowments are supposed to be. A focus on resilience results in less inequality. With additional simulations, we show that the optimal endowment allocation needs to account for both the resilience and the efficiency of cooperation. AU - Hübner, Valentin AU - Staab, Manuel AU - Hilbe, Christian AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Kleshnina, Maria ID - 15083 IS - 10 JF - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences SN - 0027-8424 TI - Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas VL - 121 ER - TY - GEN AB - in the research article "Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas" (by Valentin Hübner, Manuel Staab, Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Maria Kleshnina). We used different implementations for the case of two and three players, both described below. AU - Hübner, Valentin AU - Kleshnina, Maria ID - 15108 TI - Computer code for "Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas" ER - TY - CONF AB - Turn-based stochastic games (aka simple stochastic games) are two-player zero-sum games played on directed graphs with probabilistic transitions. The goal of player-max is to maximize the probability to reach a target state against the adversarial player-min. These games lie in NP ∩ coNP and are among the rare combinatorial problems that belong to this complexity class for which the existence of polynomial-time algorithm is a major open question. While randomized sub-exponential time algorithm exists, all known deterministic algorithms require exponential time in the worst-case. An important open question has been whether faster algorithms can be obtained parametrized by the treewidth of the game graph. Even deterministic sub-exponential time algorithm for constant treewidth turn-based stochastic games has remain elusive. In this work our main result is a deterministic algorithm to solve turn-based stochastic games that, given a game with n states, treewidth at most t, and the bit-complexity of the probabilistic transition function log D, has running time O ((tn2 log D)t log n). In particular, our algorithm is quasi-polynomial time for games with constant or poly-logarithmic treewidth. AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Meggendorfer, Tobias AU - Saona Urmeneta, Raimundo J AU - Svoboda, Jakub ID - 12676 SN - 9781611977554 T2 - Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms TI - Faster algorithm for turn-based stochastic games with bounded treewidth ER - TY - CONF AB - Reinforcement learning has received much attention for learning controllers of deterministic systems. We consider a learner-verifier framework for stochastic control systems and survey recent methods that formally guarantee a conjunction of reachability and safety properties. Given a property and a lower bound on the probability of the property being satisfied, our framework jointly learns a control policy and a formal certificate to ensure the satisfaction of the property with a desired probability threshold. Both the control policy and the formal certificate are continuous functions from states to reals, which are learned as parameterized neural networks. While in the deterministic case, the certificates are invariant and barrier functions for safety, or Lyapunov and ranking functions for liveness, in the stochastic case the certificates are supermartingales. For certificate verification, we use interval arithmetic abstract interpretation to bound the expected values of neural network functions. AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Henzinger, Thomas A AU - Lechner, Mathias AU - Zikelic, Dorde ID - 13142 SN - 0302-9743 T2 - Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems TI - A learner-verifier framework for neural network controllers and certificates of stochastic systems VL - 13993 ER - TY - JOUR AB - Populations evolve in spatially heterogeneous environments. While a certain trait might bring a fitness advantage in some patch of the environment, a different trait might be advantageous in another patch. Here, we study the Moran birth–death process with two types of individuals in a population stretched across two patches of size N, each patch favouring one of the two types. We show that the long-term fate of such populations crucially depends on the migration rate μ between the patches. To classify the possible fates, we use the distinction between polynomial (short) and exponential (long) timescales. We show that when μ is high then one of the two types fixates on the whole population after a number of steps that is only polynomial in N. By contrast, when μ is low then each type holds majority in the patch where it is favoured for a number of steps that is at least exponential in N. Moreover, we precisely identify the threshold migration rate μ⋆ that separates those two scenarios, thereby exactly delineating the situations that support long-term coexistence of the two types. We also discuss the case of various cycle graphs and we present computer simulations that perfectly match our analytical results. AU - Svoboda, Jakub AU - Tkadlec, Josef AU - Kaveh, Kamran AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu ID - 12787 IS - 2271 JF - Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences SN - 1364-5021 TI - Coexistence times in the Moran process with environmental heterogeneity VL - 479 ER - TY - JOUR AB - The field of indirect reciprocity investigates how social norms can foster cooperation when individuals continuously monitor and assess each other’s social interactions. By adhering to certain social norms, cooperating individuals can improve their reputation and, in turn, receive benefits from others. Eight social norms, known as the “leading eight," have been shown to effectively promote the evolution of cooperation as long as information is public and reliable. These norms categorize group members as either ’good’ or ’bad’. In this study, we examine a scenario where individuals instead assign nuanced reputation scores to each other, and only cooperate with those whose reputation exceeds a certain threshold. We find both analytically and through simulations that such quantitative assessments are error-correcting, thus facilitating cooperation in situations where information is private and unreliable. Moreover, our results identify four specific norms that are robust to such conditions, and may be relevant for helping to sustain cooperation in natural populations. AU - Schmid, Laura AU - Ekbatani, Farbod AU - Hilbe, Christian AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu ID - 12861 JF - Nature Communications TI - Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information VL - 14 ER - TY - CONF AB - We study the problem of training and certifying adversarially robust quantized neural networks (QNNs). Quantization is a technique for making neural networks more efficient by running them using low-bit integer arithmetic and is therefore commonly adopted in industry. Recent work has shown that floating-point neural networks that have been verified to be robust can become vulnerable to adversarial attacks after quantization, and certification of the quantized representation is necessary to guarantee robustness. In this work, we present quantization-aware interval bound propagation (QA-IBP), a novel method for training robust QNNs. Inspired by advances in robust learning of non-quantized networks, our training algorithm computes the gradient of an abstract representation of the actual network. Unlike existing approaches, our method can handle the discrete semantics of QNNs. Based on QA-IBP, we also develop a complete verification procedure for verifying the adversarial robustness of QNNs, which is guaranteed to terminate and produce a correct answer. Compared to existing approaches, the key advantage of our verification procedure is that it runs entirely on GPU or other accelerator devices. We demonstrate experimentally that our approach significantly outperforms existing methods and establish the new state-of-the-art for training and certifying the robustness of QNNs. AU - Lechner, Mathias AU - Zikelic, Dorde AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Henzinger, Thomas A AU - Rus, Daniela ID - 14242 IS - 12 SN - 9781577358800 T2 - Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence TI - Quantization-aware interval bound propagation for training certifiably robust quantized neural networks VL - 37 ER - TY - CONF AB - Two-player zero-sum "graph games" are central in logic, verification, and multi-agent systems. The game proceeds by placing a token on a vertex of a graph, and allowing the players to move it to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner or payoff of the game. Traditionally, the players alternate turns in moving the token. In "bidding games", however, the players have budgets and in each turn, an auction (bidding) determines which player moves the token. So far, bidding games have only been studied as full-information games. In this work we initiate the study of partial-information bidding games: we study bidding games in which a player's initial budget is drawn from a known probability distribution. We show that while for some bidding mechanisms and objectives, it is straightforward to adapt the results from the full-information setting to the partial-information setting, for others, the analysis is significantly more challenging, requires new techniques, and gives rise to interesting results. Specifically, we study games with "mean-payoff" objectives in combination with "poorman" bidding. We construct optimal strategies for a partially-informed player who plays against a fully-informed adversary. We show that, somewhat surprisingly, the "value" under pure strategies does not necessarily exist in such games. AU - Avni, Guy AU - Jecker, Ismael R AU - Zikelic, Dorde ID - 14243 IS - 5 SN - 9781577358800 T2 - Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence TI - Bidding graph games with partially-observable budgets VL - 37 ER - TY - CONF AB - We provide a learning-based technique for guessing a winning strategy in a parity game originating from an LTL synthesis problem. A cheaply obtained guess can be useful in several applications. Not only can the guessed strategy be applied as best-effort in cases where the game’s huge size prohibits rigorous approaches, but it can also increase the scalability of rigorous LTL synthesis in several ways. Firstly, checking whether a guessed strategy is winning is easier than constructing one. Secondly, even if the guess is wrong in some places, it can be fixed by strategy iteration faster than constructing one from scratch. Thirdly, the guess can be used in on-the-fly approaches to prioritize exploration in the most fruitful directions. In contrast to previous works, we (i) reflect the highly structured logical information in game’s states, the so-called semantic labelling, coming from the recent LTL-to-automata translations, and (ii) learn to reflect it properly by learning from previously solved games, bringing the solving process closer to human-like reasoning. AU - Kretinsky, Jan AU - Meggendorfer, Tobias AU - Prokop, Maximilian AU - Rieder, Sabine ID - 14259 SN - 0302-9743 T2 - 35th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification TI - Guessing winning policies in LTL synthesis by semantic learning VL - 13964 ER - TY - CONF AB - Probabilistic recurrence relations (PRRs) are a standard formalism for describing the runtime of a randomized algorithm. Given a PRR and a time limit κ, we consider the tail probability Pr[T≥κ], i.e., the probability that the randomized runtime T of the PRR exceeds κ. Our focus is the formal analysis of tail bounds that aims at finding a tight asymptotic upper bound u≥Pr[T≥κ]. To address this problem, the classical and most well-known approach is the cookbook method by Karp (JACM 1994), while other approaches are mostly limited to deriving tail bounds of specific PRRs via involved custom analysis. In this work, we propose a novel approach for deriving the common exponentially-decreasing tail bounds for PRRs whose preprocessing time and random passed sizes observe discrete or (piecewise) uniform distribution and whose recursive call is either a single procedure call or a divide-and-conquer. We first establish a theoretical approach via Markov’s inequality, and then instantiate the theoretical approach with a template-based algorithmic approach via a refined treatment of exponentiation. Experimental evaluation shows that our algorithmic approach is capable of deriving tail bounds that are (i) asymptotically tighter than Karp’s method, (ii) match the best-known manually-derived asymptotic tail bound for QuickSelect, and (iii) is only slightly worse (with a loglogn factor) than the manually-proven optimal asymptotic tail bound for QuickSort. Moreover, our algorithmic approach handles all examples (including realistic PRRs such as QuickSort, QuickSelect, DiameterComputation, etc.) in less than 0.1 s, showing that our approach is efficient in practice. AU - Sun, Yican AU - Fu, Hongfei AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Goharshady, Amir Kafshdar ID - 14318 SN - 0302-9743 T2 - Computer Aided Verification TI - Automated tail bound analysis for probabilistic recurrence relations VL - 13966 ER - TY - CONF AB - Markov decision processes can be viewed as transformers of probability distributions. While this view is useful from a practical standpoint to reason about trajectories of distributions, basic reachability and safety problems are known to be computationally intractable (i.e., Skolem-hard) to solve in such models. Further, we show that even for simple examples of MDPs, strategies for safety objectives over distributions can require infinite memory and randomization. In light of this, we present a novel overapproximation approach to synthesize strategies in an MDP, such that a safety objective over the distributions is met. More precisely, we develop a new framework for template-based synthesis of certificates as affine distributional and inductive invariants for safety objectives in MDPs. We provide two algorithms within this framework. One can only synthesize memoryless strategies, but has relative completeness guarantees, while the other can synthesize general strategies. The runtime complexity of both algorithms is in PSPACE. We implement these algorithms and show that they can solve several non-trivial examples. AU - Akshay, S. AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Meggendorfer, Tobias AU - Zikelic, Dorde ID - 14317 SN - 0302-9743 T2 - International Conference on Computer Aided Verification TI - MDPs as distribution transformers: Affine invariant synthesis for safety objectives VL - 13966 ER - TY - JOUR AB - We study turn-based stochastic zero-sum games with lexicographic preferences over objectives. Stochastic games are standard models in control, verification, and synthesis of stochastic reactive systems that exhibit both randomness as well as controllable and adversarial non-determinism. Lexicographic order allows one to consider multiple objectives with a strict preference order. To the best of our knowledge, stochastic games with lexicographic objectives have not been studied before. For a mixture of reachability and safety objectives, we show that deterministic lexicographically optimal strategies exist and memory is only required to remember the already satisfied and violated objectives. For a constant number of objectives, we show that the relevant decision problem is in NP∩coNP, matching the current known bound for single objectives; and in general the decision problem is PSPACE-hard and can be solved in NEXPTIME∩coNEXPTIME. We present an algorithm that computes the lexicographically optimal strategies via a reduction to the computation of optimal strategies in a sequence of single-objectives games. For omega-regular objectives, we restrict our analysis to one-player games, also known as Markov decision processes. We show that lexicographically optimal strategies exist and need either randomization or finite memory. We present an algorithm that solves the relevant decision problem in polynomial time. We have implemented our algorithms and report experimental results on various case studies. AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Katoen, Joost P AU - Mohr, Stefanie AU - Weininger, Maximilian AU - Winkler, Tobias ID - 12738 JF - Formal Methods in System Design TI - Stochastic games with lexicographic objectives ER - TY - JOUR AB - Mathematical models often aim to describe a complicated mechanism in a cohesive and simple manner. However, reaching perfect balance between being simple enough or overly simplistic is a challenging task. Frequently, game-theoretic models have an underlying assumption that players, whenever they choose to execute a specific action, do so perfectly. In fact, it is rare that action execution perfectly coincides with intentions of individuals, giving rise to behavioural mistakes. The concept of incompetence of players was suggested to address this issue in game-theoretic settings. Under the assumption of incompetence, players have non-zero probabilities of executing a different strategy from the one they chose, leading to stochastic outcomes of the interactions. In this article, we survey results related to the concept of incompetence in classic as well as evolutionary game theory and provide several new results. We also suggest future extensions of the model and argue why it is important to take into account behavioural mistakes when analysing interactions among players in both economic and biological settings. AU - Graham, Thomas AU - Kleshnina, Maria AU - Filar, Jerzy A. ID - 10770 JF - Dynamic Games and Applications SN - 2153-0785 TI - Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players VL - 13 ER - TY - CONF AB - Entropic risk (ERisk) is an established risk measure in finance, quantifying risk by an exponential re-weighting of rewards. We study ERisk for the first time in the context of turn-based stochastic games with the total reward objective. This gives rise to an objective function that demands the control of systems in a risk-averse manner. We show that the resulting games are determined and, in particular, admit optimal memoryless deterministic strategies. This contrasts risk measures that previously have been considered in the special case of Markov decision processes and that require randomization and/or memory. We provide several results on the decidability and the computational complexity of the threshold problem, i.e. whether the optimal value of ERisk exceeds a given threshold. In the most general case, the problem is decidable subject to Shanuel’s conjecture. If all inputs are rational, the resulting threshold problem can be solved using algebraic numbers, leading to decidability via a polynomial-time reduction to the existential theory of the reals. Further restrictions on the encoding of the input allow the solution of the threshold problem in NP∩coNP. Finally, an approximation algorithm for the optimal value of ERisk is provided. AU - Baier, Christel AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Meggendorfer, Tobias AU - Piribauer, Jakob ID - 14417 SN - 9783959772921 T2 - 48th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science TI - Entropic risk for turn-based stochastic games VL - 272 ER - TY - JOUR AB - Allometric settings of population dynamics models are appealing due to their parsimonious nature and broad utility when studying system level effects. Here, we parameterise the size-scaled Rosenzweig-MacArthur differential equations to eliminate prey-mass dependency, facilitating an in depth analytic study of the equations which incorporates scaling parameters’ contributions to coexistence. We define the functional response term to match empirical findings, and examine situations where metabolic theory derivations and observation diverge. The dynamical properties of the Rosenzweig-MacArthur system, encompassing the distribution of size-abundance equilibria, the scaling of period and amplitude of population cycling, and relationships between predator and prey abundances, are consistent with empirical observation. Our parameterisation is an accurate minimal model across 15+ orders of mass magnitude. AU - Mckerral, Jody C. AU - Kleshnina, Maria AU - Ejov, Vladimir AU - Bartle, Louise AU - Mitchell, James G. AU - Filar, Jerzy A. ID - 12706 IS - 2 JF - PLoS One TI - Empirical parameterisation and dynamical analysis of the allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur equations VL - 18 ER - TY - CONF AB - We consider bidding games, a class of two-player zero-sum graph games. The game proceeds as follows. Both players have bounded budgets. A token is placed on a vertex of a graph, in each turn the players simultaneously submit bids, and the higher bidder moves the token, where we break bidding ties in favor of Player 1. Player 1 wins the game iff the token visits a designated target vertex. We consider, for the first time, poorman discrete-bidding in which the granularity of the bids is restricted and the higher bid is paid to the bank. Previous work either did not impose granularity restrictions or considered Richman bidding (bids are paid to the opponent). While the latter mechanisms are technically more accessible, the former is more appealing from a practical standpoint. Our study focuses on threshold budgets, which is the necessary and sufficient initial budget required for Player 1 to ensure winning against a given Player 2 budget. We first show existence of thresholds. In DAGs, we show that threshold budgets can be approximated with error bounds by thresholds under continuous-bidding and that they exhibit a periodic behavior. We identify closed-form solutions in special cases. We implement and experiment with an algorithm to find threshold budgets. AU - Avni, Guy AU - Meggendorfer, Tobias AU - Sadhukhan, Suman AU - Tkadlec, Josef AU - Zikelic, Dorde ID - 14518 SN - 0922-6389 T2 - Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications TI - Reachability poorman discrete-bidding games VL - 372 ER - TY - CONF AB - We consider the problem of learning control policies in discrete-time stochastic systems which guarantee that the system stabilizes within some specified stabilization region with probability 1. Our approach is based on the novel notion of stabilizing ranking supermartingales (sRSMs) that we introduce in this work. Our sRSMs overcome the limitation of methods proposed in previous works whose applicability is restricted to systems in which the stabilizing region cannot be left once entered under any control policy. We present a learning procedure that learns a control policy together with an sRSM that formally certifies probability 1 stability, both learned as neural networks. We show that this procedure can also be adapted to formally verifying that, under a given Lipschitz continuous control policy, the stochastic system stabilizes within some stabilizing region with probability 1. Our experimental evaluation shows that our learning procedure can successfully learn provably stabilizing policies in practice. AU - Ansaripour, Matin AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Henzinger, Thomas A AU - Lechner, Mathias AU - Zikelic, Dorde ID - 14559 SN - 0302-9743 T2 - 21st International Symposium on Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis TI - Learning provably stabilizing neural controllers for discrete-time stochastic systems VL - 14215 ER - TY - CONF AB - We consider a natural problem dealing with weighted packet selection across a rechargeable link, which e.g., finds applications in cryptocurrency networks. The capacity of a link (u, v) is determined by how much nodes u and v allocate for this link. Specifically, the input is a finite ordered sequence of packets that arrive in both directions along a link. Given (u, v) and a packet of weight x going from u to v, node u can either accept or reject the packet. If u accepts the packet, the capacity on link (u, v) decreases by x. Correspondingly, v’s capacity on (u, v) increases by x. If a node rejects the packet, this will entail a cost affinely linear in the weight of the packet. A link is “rechargeable” in the sense that the total capacity of the link has to remain constant, but the allocation of capacity at the ends of the link can depend arbitrarily on the nodes’ decisions. The goal is to minimise the sum of the capacity injected into the link and the cost of rejecting packets. We show that the problem is NP-hard, but can be approximated efficiently with a ratio of (1+ε)⋅(1+3–√) for some arbitrary ε>0. . AU - Schmid, Stefan AU - Svoboda, Jakub AU - Yeo, Michelle X ID - 13238 SN - 0302-9743 T2 - SIROCCO 2023: Structural Information and Communication Complexity TI - Weighted packet selection for rechargeable links in cryptocurrency networks: Complexity and approximation VL - 13892 ER -