---
_id: '14820'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We consider a natural problem dealing with weighted packet selection across
a rechargeable link, which e.g., finds applications in cryptocurrency networks.
The capacity of a link (u, v) is determined by how many nodes u and v allocate
for this link. Specifically, the input is a finite ordered sequence of packets
that arrive in both directions along a link. Given (u, v) and a packet of weight
x going from u to v, node u can either accept or reject the packet. If u accepts
the packet, the capacity on link (u, v) decreases by x. Correspondingly, v's capacity
on \r\n increases by x. If a node rejects the packet, this will entail a cost
affinely linear in the weight of the packet. A link is “rechargeable” in the sense
that the total capacity of the link has to remain constant, but the allocation
of capacity at the ends of the link can depend arbitrarily on the nodes' decisions.
The goal is to minimise the sum of the capacity injected into the link and the
cost of rejecting packets. We show that the problem is NP-hard, but can be approximated
efficiently with a ratio of (1+E) . (1+3) for some arbitrary E>0."
acknowledgement: We thank Mahsa Bastankhah and Mohammad Ali Maddah-Ali for fruitful
discussions about different variants of the problem. This work is supported by the
European Research Council (ERC) Consolidator Project 864228 (AdjustNet), 2020-2025,
the ERC CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt), and the German Research Foundation (DFG) grant
470029389 (FlexNets), 2021-2024.
article_number: '114353'
article_processing_charge: Yes (via OA deal)
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Schmid, Stefan
last_name: Schmid
- first_name: Jakub
full_name: Svoboda, Jakub
id: 130759D2-D7DD-11E9-87D2-DE0DE6697425
last_name: Svoboda
orcid: 0000-0002-1419-3267
- first_name: Michelle X
full_name: Yeo, Michelle X
id: 2D82B818-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Yeo
citation:
ama: 'Schmid S, Svoboda J, Yeo MX. Weighted packet selection for rechargeable links
in cryptocurrency networks: Complexity and approximation. Theoretical Computer
Science. 2024;989. doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114353'
apa: 'Schmid, S., Svoboda, J., & Yeo, M. X. (2024). Weighted packet selection
for rechargeable links in cryptocurrency networks: Complexity and approximation.
Theoretical Computer Science. Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114353'
chicago: 'Schmid, Stefan, Jakub Svoboda, and Michelle X Yeo. “Weighted Packet Selection
for Rechargeable Links in Cryptocurrency Networks: Complexity and Approximation.”
Theoretical Computer Science. Elsevier, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114353.'
ieee: 'S. Schmid, J. Svoboda, and M. X. Yeo, “Weighted packet selection for rechargeable
links in cryptocurrency networks: Complexity and approximation,” Theoretical
Computer Science, vol. 989. Elsevier, 2024.'
ista: 'Schmid S, Svoboda J, Yeo MX. 2024. Weighted packet selection for rechargeable
links in cryptocurrency networks: Complexity and approximation. Theoretical Computer
Science. 989, 114353.'
mla: 'Schmid, Stefan, et al. “Weighted Packet Selection for Rechargeable Links in
Cryptocurrency Networks: Complexity and Approximation.” Theoretical Computer
Science, vol. 989, 114353, Elsevier, 2024, doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114353.'
short: S. Schmid, J. Svoboda, M.X. Yeo, Theoretical Computer Science 989 (2024).
date_created: 2024-01-16T13:40:41Z
date_published: 2024-01-11T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2024-01-17T09:23:03Z
day: '11'
department:
- _id: KrCh
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114353
ec_funded: 1
intvolume: ' 989'
keyword:
- General Computer Science
- Theoretical Computer Science
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114353
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
publication: Theoretical Computer Science
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0304-3975
publication_status: epub_ahead
publisher: Elsevier
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'Weighted packet selection for rechargeable links in cryptocurrency networks:
Complexity and approximation'
type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 989
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '15006'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Graphical games are a useful framework for modeling the interactions of (selfish)
agents who are connected via an underlying topology and whose behaviors influence
each other. They have wide applications ranging from computer science to economics
and biology. Yet, even though an agent’s payoff only depends on the actions of
their direct neighbors in graphical games, computing the Nash equilibria and making
statements about the convergence time of "natural" local dynamics in particular
can be highly challenging. In this work, we present a novel approach for classifying
complexity of Nash equilibria in graphical games by establishing a connection
to local graph algorithms, a subfield of distributed computing. In particular,
we make the observation that the equilibria of graphical games are equivalent
to locally verifiable labelings (LVL) in graphs; vertex labelings which are verifiable
with constant-round local algorithms. This connection allows us to derive novel
lower bounds on the convergence time to equilibrium of best-response dynamics
in graphical games. Since we establish that distributed convergence can sometimes
be provably slow, we also introduce and give bounds on an intuitive notion of
"time-constrained" inefficiency of best responses. We exemplify how our results
can be used in the implementation of mechanisms that ensure convergence of best
responses to a Nash equilibrium. Our results thus also give insight into the convergence
of strategy-proof algorithms for graphical games, which is still not well understood.
acknowledgement: This work was partially funded by the Academy of Finland, grant 314888,
the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt), and the Austrian Science
Fund (FWF) project I 4800-N (ADVISE). LS was supported by the Stochastic Analysis
and Application Research Center (SAARC) under National Research Foundation of Korea
grant NRF-2019R1A5A1028324.
alternative_title:
- LIPIcs
article_number: '11'
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Juho
full_name: Hirvonen, Juho
last_name: Hirvonen
- first_name: Laura
full_name: Schmid, Laura
id: 38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Schmid
orcid: 0000-0002-6978-7329
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Schmid, Stefan
last_name: Schmid
citation:
ama: 'Hirvonen J, Schmid L, Chatterjee K, Schmid S. On the convergence time in graphical
games: A locality-sensitive approach. In: 27th International Conference on
Principles of Distributed Systems. Vol 286. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum
für Informatik; 2024. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.11'
apa: 'Hirvonen, J., Schmid, L., Chatterjee, K., & Schmid, S. (2024). On the
convergence time in graphical games: A locality-sensitive approach. In 27th
International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (Vol. 286).
Tokyo, Japan: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.11'
chicago: 'Hirvonen, Juho, Laura Schmid, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Stefan Schmid.
“On the Convergence Time in Graphical Games: A Locality-Sensitive Approach.” In
27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, Vol.
286. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2024. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.11.'
ieee: 'J. Hirvonen, L. Schmid, K. Chatterjee, and S. Schmid, “On the convergence
time in graphical games: A locality-sensitive approach,” in 27th International
Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, Tokyo, Japan, 2024, vol.
286.'
ista: 'Hirvonen J, Schmid L, Chatterjee K, Schmid S. 2024. On the convergence time
in graphical games: A locality-sensitive approach. 27th International Conference
on Principles of Distributed Systems. OPODIS: Conference on Principles of Distributed
Systems, LIPIcs, vol. 286, 11.'
mla: 'Hirvonen, Juho, et al. “On the Convergence Time in Graphical Games: A Locality-Sensitive
Approach.” 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems,
vol. 286, 11, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2024, doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.11.'
short: J. Hirvonen, L. Schmid, K. Chatterjee, S. Schmid, in:, 27th International
Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum
für Informatik, 2024.
conference:
end_date: 2023-12-08
location: Tokyo, Japan
name: 'OPODIS: Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems'
start_date: 2023-12-06
date_created: 2024-02-18T23:01:01Z
date_published: 2024-01-18T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2024-02-26T09:16:12Z
day: '18'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.11
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
arxiv:
- '2102.13457'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 4fc7eea6e4ba140b904781fc7df868ec
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2024-02-26T09:04:58Z
date_updated: 2024-02-26T09:04:58Z
file_id: '15028'
file_name: 2024_LIPICs_Hirvonen.pdf
file_size: 867363
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2024-02-26T09:04:58Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 286'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
publication: 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- '9783959773089'
issn:
- '18688969'
publication_status: published
publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: 'On the convergence time in graphical games: A locality-sensitive approach'
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 286
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '15083'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for cooperation in social
dilemmas. The very logic of reciprocity, however, seems to require that individuals
are symmetric, and that everyone has the same means to influence each others’
payoffs. Yet in many applications, individuals are asymmetric. Herein, we study
the effect of asymmetry in linear public good games. Individuals may differ in
their endowments (their ability to contribute to a public good) and in their productivities
(how effective their contributions are). Given the individuals’ productivities,
we ask which allocation of endowments is optimal for cooperation. To this end,
we consider two notions of optimality. The first notion focuses on the resilience
of cooperation. The respective endowment distribution ensures that full cooperation
is feasible even under the most adverse conditions. The second notion focuses
on efficiency. The corresponding endowment distribution maximizes group welfare.
Using analytical methods, we fully characterize these two endowment distributions.
This analysis reveals that both optimality notions favor some endowment inequality:
More productive players ought to get higher endowments. Yet the two notions disagree
on how unequal endowments are supposed to be. A focus on resilience results in
less inequality. With additional simulations, we show that the optimal endowment
allocation needs to account for both the resilience and the efficiency of cooperation.'
acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818
(ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.) and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529:
E-DIRECT (to C.H.), the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program
under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411 and the French Agence Nationale
de la Recherche (under the Investissement d’Avenir Programme, ANR-17-EURE-0010)
(to M.K.).'
article_number: e2315558121
article_processing_charge: Yes (in subscription journal)
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Valentin
full_name: Hübner, Valentin
id: 2c8aa207-dc7d-11ea-9b2f-f22972ecd910
last_name: Hübner
- first_name: Manuel
full_name: Staab, Manuel
last_name: Staab
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Maria
full_name: Kleshnina, Maria
last_name: Kleshnina
citation:
ama: Hübner V, Staab M, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Kleshnina M. Efficiency and resilience
of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences. 2024;121(10). doi:10.1073/pnas.2315558121
apa: Hübner, V., Staab, M., Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Kleshnina, M. (2024).
Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2315558121
chicago: Hübner, Valentin, Manuel Staab, Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu Chatterjee,
and Maria Kleshnina. “Efficiency and Resilience of Cooperation in Asymmetric Social
Dilemmas.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2315558121.
ieee: V. Hübner, M. Staab, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, and M. Kleshnina, “Efficiency
and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas,” Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 121, no. 10. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 2024.
ista: Hübner V, Staab M, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Kleshnina M. 2024. Efficiency and
resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences. 121(10), e2315558121.
mla: Hübner, Valentin, et al. “Efficiency and Resilience of Cooperation in Asymmetric
Social Dilemmas.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol.
121, no. 10, e2315558121, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2024,
doi:10.1073/pnas.2315558121.
short: V. Hübner, M. Staab, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M. Kleshnina, Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences 121 (2024).
date_created: 2024-03-05T09:18:49Z
date_published: 2024-03-05T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2024-03-12T13:29:25Z
day: '05'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1073/pnas.2315558121
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
pmid:
- '38408249'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 068520e3efd4d008bb9177e8aedb7d22
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2024-03-12T13:12:22Z
date_updated: 2024-03-12T13:12:22Z
file_id: '15109'
file_name: 2024_PNAS_Huebner.pdf
file_size: 2203220
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2024-03-12T13:12:22Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 121'
issue: '10'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '03'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
pmid: 1
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
- _id: 260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '754411'
name: ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships
publication: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1091-6490
issn:
- 0027-8424
publication_status: published
publisher: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
link:
- description: News on ISTA Website
relation: press_release
url: https://ista.ac.at/en/news/what-math-tells-us-about-social-dilemmas/
record:
- id: '15108'
relation: research_data
status: public
status: public
title: Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by_nc_nd.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
short: CC BY-NC-ND (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 121
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '15108'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "in the research article \"Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric
social dilemmas\" (by Valentin Hübner, Manuel Staab, Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu
Chatterjee, and Maria Kleshnina).\r\n\r\nWe used different implementations for
the case of two and three players, both described below."
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Valentin
full_name: Hübner, Valentin
id: 2c8aa207-dc7d-11ea-9b2f-f22972ecd910
last_name: Hübner
- first_name: Maria
full_name: Kleshnina, Maria
last_name: Kleshnina
citation:
ama: Hübner V, Kleshnina M. Computer code for “Efficiency and resilience of cooperation
in asymmetric social dilemmas.” 2024. doi:10.5281/ZENODO.10639167
apa: Hübner, V., & Kleshnina, M. (2024). Computer code for “Efficiency and resilience
of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas.” Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.10639167
chicago: Hübner, Valentin, and Maria Kleshnina. “Computer Code for ‘Efficiency and
Resilience of Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas.’” Zenodo, 2024. https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.10639167.
ieee: V. Hübner and M. Kleshnina, “Computer code for ‘Efficiency and resilience
of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas.’” Zenodo, 2024.
ista: Hübner V, Kleshnina M. 2024. Computer code for ‘Efficiency and resilience
of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas’, Zenodo, 10.5281/ZENODO.10639167.
mla: Hübner, Valentin, and Maria Kleshnina. Computer Code for “Efficiency and
Resilience of Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas.” Zenodo, 2024, doi:10.5281/ZENODO.10639167.
short: V. Hübner, M. Kleshnina, (2024).
date_created: 2024-03-12T13:02:58Z
date_published: 2024-02-09T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2024-03-12T13:29:26Z
day: '09'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.5281/ZENODO.10639167
has_accepted_license: '1'
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://10.5281/zenodo.10639167
month: '02'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
publisher: Zenodo
related_material:
record:
- id: '15083'
relation: used_in_publication
status: public
status: public
title: Computer code for "Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social
dilemmas"
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: research_data_reference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '12676'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Turn-based stochastic games (aka simple stochastic games) are two-player zero-sum
games played on directed graphs with probabilistic transitions. The goal of player-max
is to maximize the probability to reach a target state against the adversarial
player-min. These games lie in NP ∩ coNP and are among the rare combinatorial
problems that belong to this complexity class for which the existence of polynomial-time
algorithm is a major open question. While randomized sub-exponential time algorithm
exists, all known deterministic algorithms require exponential time in the worst-case.
An important open question has been whether faster algorithms can be obtained
parametrized by the treewidth of the game graph. Even deterministic sub-exponential
time algorithm for constant treewidth turn-based stochastic games has remain elusive.
In this work our main result is a deterministic algorithm to solve turn-based
stochastic games that, given a game with n states, treewidth at most t, and the
bit-complexity of the probabilistic transition function log D, has running time
O ((tn2 log D)t log n). In particular, our algorithm is quasi-polynomial time
for games with constant or poly-logarithmic treewidth.
acknowledgement: This research was partially supported by the ERC CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt)
grant.
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Tobias
full_name: Meggendorfer, Tobias
id: b21b0c15-30a2-11eb-80dc-f13ca25802e1
last_name: Meggendorfer
orcid: 0000-0002-1712-2165
- first_name: Raimundo J
full_name: Saona Urmeneta, Raimundo J
id: BD1DF4C4-D767-11E9-B658-BC13E6697425
last_name: Saona Urmeneta
orcid: 0000-0001-5103-038X
- first_name: Jakub
full_name: Svoboda, Jakub
id: 130759D2-D7DD-11E9-87D2-DE0DE6697425
last_name: Svoboda
citation:
ama: 'Chatterjee K, Meggendorfer T, Saona Urmeneta RJ, Svoboda J. Faster algorithm
for turn-based stochastic games with bounded treewidth. In: Proceedings of
the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. Society for Industrial
and Applied Mathematics; 2023:4590-4605. doi:10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch173'
apa: 'Chatterjee, K., Meggendorfer, T., Saona Urmeneta, R. J., & Svoboda, J.
(2023). Faster algorithm for turn-based stochastic games with bounded treewidth.
In Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
(pp. 4590–4605). Florence, Italy: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch173'
chicago: Chatterjee, Krishnendu, Tobias Meggendorfer, Raimundo J Saona Urmeneta,
and Jakub Svoboda. “Faster Algorithm for Turn-Based Stochastic Games with Bounded
Treewidth.” In Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete
Algorithms, 4590–4605. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2023.
https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch173.
ieee: K. Chatterjee, T. Meggendorfer, R. J. Saona Urmeneta, and J. Svoboda, “Faster
algorithm for turn-based stochastic games with bounded treewidth,” in Proceedings
of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, Florence, Italy,
2023, pp. 4590–4605.
ista: 'Chatterjee K, Meggendorfer T, Saona Urmeneta RJ, Svoboda J. 2023. Faster
algorithm for turn-based stochastic games with bounded treewidth. Proceedings
of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. SODA: Symposium
on Discrete Algorithms, 4590–4605.'
mla: Chatterjee, Krishnendu, et al. “Faster Algorithm for Turn-Based Stochastic
Games with Bounded Treewidth.” Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium
on Discrete Algorithms, Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2023,
pp. 4590–605, doi:10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch173.
short: K. Chatterjee, T. Meggendorfer, R.J. Saona Urmeneta, J. Svoboda, in:, Proceedings
of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, Society for Industrial
and Applied Mathematics, 2023, pp. 4590–4605.
conference:
end_date: 2023-01-25
location: Florence, Italy
name: 'SODA: Symposium on Discrete Algorithms'
start_date: 2023-01-22
date_created: 2023-02-24T12:20:47Z
date_published: 2023-02-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-02-27T09:01:16Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: GradSch
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch173
ec_funded: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch173
month: '02'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 4590-4605
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
publication: Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- '9781611977554'
publication_status: published
publisher: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: Faster algorithm for turn-based stochastic games with bounded treewidth
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
year: '2023'
...