--- _id: '10770' abstract: - lang: eng text: Mathematical models often aim to describe a complicated mechanism in a cohesive and simple manner. However, reaching perfect balance between being simple enough or overly simplistic is a challenging task. Frequently, game-theoretic models have an underlying assumption that players, whenever they choose to execute a specific action, do so perfectly. In fact, it is rare that action execution perfectly coincides with intentions of individuals, giving rise to behavioural mistakes. The concept of incompetence of players was suggested to address this issue in game-theoretic settings. Under the assumption of incompetence, players have non-zero probabilities of executing a different strategy from the one they chose, leading to stochastic outcomes of the interactions. In this article, we survey results related to the concept of incompetence in classic as well as evolutionary game theory and provide several new results. We also suggest future extensions of the model and argue why it is important to take into account behavioural mistakes when analysing interactions among players in both economic and biological settings. acknowledgement: "The authors would like to acknowledge stimulating email discussions with Dr Wayne Lobb of W.A. Lobb LLC on the topic of evolutionary games. We also thank Dr Thomas Taimre for his input to the material in Sect. 3.\r\nThe authors would like to acknowledge partial support from the Australian Research Council under the Discovery grant DP180101602 and support by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411." article_processing_charge: No article_type: original author: - first_name: Thomas full_name: Graham, Thomas last_name: Graham - first_name: Maria full_name: Kleshnina, Maria id: 4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Kleshnina - first_name: Jerzy A. full_name: Filar, Jerzy A. last_name: Filar citation: ama: Graham T, Kleshnina M, Filar JA. Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players. Dynamic Games and Applications. 2023;13:231-264. doi:10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3 apa: Graham, T., Kleshnina, M., & Filar, J. A. (2023). Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players. Dynamic Games and Applications. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3 chicago: Graham, Thomas, Maria Kleshnina, and Jerzy A. Filar. “Where Do Mistakes Lead? A Survey of Games with Incompetent Players.” Dynamic Games and Applications. Springer Nature, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3. ieee: T. Graham, M. Kleshnina, and J. A. Filar, “Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players,” Dynamic Games and Applications, vol. 13. Springer Nature, pp. 231–264, 2023. ista: Graham T, Kleshnina M, Filar JA. 2023. Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players. Dynamic Games and Applications. 13, 231–264. mla: Graham, Thomas, et al. “Where Do Mistakes Lead? A Survey of Games with Incompetent Players.” Dynamic Games and Applications, vol. 13, Springer Nature, 2023, pp. 231–64, doi:10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3. short: T. Graham, M. Kleshnina, J.A. Filar, Dynamic Games and Applications 13 (2023) 231–264. date_created: 2022-02-20T23:01:32Z date_published: 2023-03-01T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2023-10-04T09:24:30Z day: '01' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '000753777100001' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: cd53b07e96f9030ddb348f305e5b58c7 content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2022-02-21T08:54:17Z date_updated: 2022-02-21T08:54:17Z file_id: '10781' file_name: 2022_DynamicGamesApplic_Graham.pdf file_size: 1890512 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2022-02-21T08:54:17Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 13' isi: 1 language: - iso: eng month: '03' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version page: 231-264 project: - _id: 260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '754411' name: ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships publication: Dynamic Games and Applications publication_identifier: eissn: - 2153-0793 issn: - 2153-0785 publication_status: published publisher: Springer Nature quality_controlled: '1' scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players tmp: image: /images/cc_by.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0) short: CC BY (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 volume: 13 year: '2023' ... --- _id: '12706' abstract: - lang: eng text: Allometric settings of population dynamics models are appealing due to their parsimonious nature and broad utility when studying system level effects. Here, we parameterise the size-scaled Rosenzweig-MacArthur differential equations to eliminate prey-mass dependency, facilitating an in depth analytic study of the equations which incorporates scaling parameters’ contributions to coexistence. We define the functional response term to match empirical findings, and examine situations where metabolic theory derivations and observation diverge. The dynamical properties of the Rosenzweig-MacArthur system, encompassing the distribution of size-abundance equilibria, the scaling of period and amplitude of population cycling, and relationships between predator and prey abundances, are consistent with empirical observation. Our parameterisation is an accurate minimal model across 15+ orders of mass magnitude. acknowledgement: "This research was supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program\r\n(RTP) Scholarship to JCM (https://www.dese.gov.au), and LB is supported by the Centre de\r\nrecherche sur le vieillissement Fellowship Program. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript." article_processing_charge: No article_type: original author: - first_name: Jody C. full_name: Mckerral, Jody C. last_name: Mckerral - first_name: Maria full_name: Kleshnina, Maria id: 4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Kleshnina - first_name: Vladimir full_name: Ejov, Vladimir last_name: Ejov - first_name: Louise full_name: Bartle, Louise last_name: Bartle - first_name: James G. full_name: Mitchell, James G. last_name: Mitchell - first_name: Jerzy A. full_name: Filar, Jerzy A. last_name: Filar citation: ama: Mckerral JC, Kleshnina M, Ejov V, Bartle L, Mitchell JG, Filar JA. Empirical parameterisation and dynamical analysis of the allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur equations. PLoS One. 2023;18(2):e0279838. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0279838 apa: Mckerral, J. C., Kleshnina, M., Ejov, V., Bartle, L., Mitchell, J. G., & Filar, J. A. (2023). Empirical parameterisation and dynamical analysis of the allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur equations. PLoS One. Public Library of Science. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279838 chicago: Mckerral, Jody C., Maria Kleshnina, Vladimir Ejov, Louise Bartle, James G. Mitchell, and Jerzy A. Filar. “Empirical Parameterisation and Dynamical Analysis of the Allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur Equations.” PLoS One. Public Library of Science, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279838. ieee: J. C. Mckerral, M. Kleshnina, V. Ejov, L. Bartle, J. G. Mitchell, and J. A. Filar, “Empirical parameterisation and dynamical analysis of the allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur equations,” PLoS One, vol. 18, no. 2. Public Library of Science, p. e0279838, 2023. ista: Mckerral JC, Kleshnina M, Ejov V, Bartle L, Mitchell JG, Filar JA. 2023. Empirical parameterisation and dynamical analysis of the allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur equations. PLoS One. 18(2), e0279838. mla: Mckerral, Jody C., et al. “Empirical Parameterisation and Dynamical Analysis of the Allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur Equations.” PLoS One, vol. 18, no. 2, Public Library of Science, 2023, p. e0279838, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0279838. short: J.C. Mckerral, M. Kleshnina, V. Ejov, L. Bartle, J.G. Mitchell, J.A. Filar, PLoS One 18 (2023) e0279838. date_created: 2023-03-05T23:01:05Z date_published: 2023-02-27T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2023-10-17T12:53:30Z day: '27' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0279838 external_id: isi: - '000996122900022' pmid: - '36848357' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 798ed5739a4117b03173e5d56e0534c9 content_type: application/pdf creator: cchlebak date_created: 2023-03-07T10:26:45Z date_updated: 2023-03-07T10:26:45Z file_id: '12712' file_name: 2023_PLOSOne_Mckerral.pdf file_size: 1257003 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2023-03-07T10:26:45Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 18' isi: 1 issue: '2' language: - iso: eng month: '02' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version page: e0279838 pmid: 1 publication: PLoS One publication_identifier: eissn: - 1932-6203 publication_status: published publisher: Public Library of Science quality_controlled: '1' scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Empirical parameterisation and dynamical analysis of the allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur equations tmp: image: /images/cc_by.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0) short: CC BY (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 volume: 18 year: '2023' ... --- _id: '13258' abstract: - lang: eng text: Many human interactions feature the characteristics of social dilemmas where individual actions have consequences for the group and the environment. The feedback between behavior and environment can be studied with the framework of stochastic games. In stochastic games, the state of the environment can change, depending on the choices made by group members. Past work suggests that such feedback can reinforce cooperative behaviors. In particular, cooperation can evolve in stochastic games even if it is infeasible in each separate repeated game. In stochastic games, participants have an interest in conditioning their strategies on the state of the environment. Yet in many applications, precise information about the state could be scarce. Here, we study how the availability of information (or lack thereof) shapes evolution of cooperation. Already for simple examples of two state games we find surprising effects. In some cases, cooperation is only possible if there is precise information about the state of the environment. In other cases, cooperation is most abundant when there is no information about the state of the environment. We systematically analyze all stochastic games of a given complexity class, to determine when receiving information about the environment is better, neutral, or worse for evolution of cooperation. acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.), the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.), the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411 and the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (under the Investissement d’Avenir programme, ANR-17-EURE-0010) (to M.K.).' article_number: '4153' article_processing_charge: Yes article_type: original author: - first_name: Maria full_name: Kleshnina, Maria id: 4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Kleshnina - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Stepan full_name: Simsa, Stepan id: 409d615c-2f95-11ee-b934-90a352102c1e last_name: Simsa orcid: 0000-0001-6687-1210 - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X - first_name: Martin A. full_name: Nowak, Martin A. last_name: Nowak citation: ama: Kleshnina M, Hilbe C, Simsa S, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature Communications. 2023;14. doi:10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9 apa: Kleshnina, M., Hilbe, C., Simsa, S., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2023). The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature Communications. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9 chicago: Kleshnina, Maria, Christian Hilbe, Stepan Simsa, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin A. Nowak. “The Effect of Environmental Information on Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Nature Communications. Springer Nature, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9. ieee: M. Kleshnina, C. Hilbe, S. Simsa, K. Chatterjee, and M. A. Nowak, “The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games,” Nature Communications, vol. 14. Springer Nature, 2023. ista: Kleshnina M, Hilbe C, Simsa S, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. 2023. The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature Communications. 14, 4153. mla: Kleshnina, Maria, et al. “The Effect of Environmental Information on Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Nature Communications, vol. 14, 4153, Springer Nature, 2023, doi:10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9. short: M. Kleshnina, C. Hilbe, S. Simsa, K. Chatterjee, M.A. Nowak, Nature Communications 14 (2023). date_created: 2023-07-23T22:01:11Z date_published: 2023-07-12T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2023-12-13T11:42:38Z day: '12' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '001029450400031' pmid: - '37438341' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 5aceefdfe76686267b93ae4fe81899f1 content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2023-07-31T11:32:36Z date_updated: 2023-07-31T11:32:36Z file_id: '13337' file_name: 2023_NatureComm_Kleshnina.pdf file_size: 1601682 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2023-07-31T11:32:36Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 14' isi: 1 language: - iso: eng month: '07' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version pmid: 1 project: - _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '863818' name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications' - _id: 260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '754411' name: ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships publication: Nature Communications publication_identifier: eissn: - 2041-1723 publication_status: published publisher: Springer Nature quality_controlled: '1' related_material: record: - id: '13336' relation: research_data status: public scopus_import: '1' status: public title: The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games tmp: image: /images/cc_by.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0) short: CC BY (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 volume: 14 year: '2023' ... --- _id: '13336' article_processing_charge: No author: - first_name: Maria full_name: Kleshnina, Maria id: 4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Kleshnina citation: ama: 'Kleshnina M. kleshnina/stochgames_info: The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. 2023. doi:10.5281/ZENODO.8059564' apa: 'Kleshnina, M. (2023). kleshnina/stochgames_info: The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.8059564' chicago: 'Kleshnina, Maria. “Kleshnina/Stochgames_info: The Effect of Environmental Information on Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Zenodo, 2023. https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.8059564.' ieee: 'M. Kleshnina, “kleshnina/stochgames_info: The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games.” Zenodo, 2023.' ista: 'Kleshnina M. 2023. kleshnina/stochgames_info: The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games, Zenodo, 10.5281/ZENODO.8059564.' mla: 'Kleshnina, Maria. Kleshnina/Stochgames_info: The Effect of Environmental Information on Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games. Zenodo, 2023, doi:10.5281/ZENODO.8059564.' short: M. Kleshnina, (2023). date_created: 2023-07-31T11:30:46Z date_published: 2023-06-20T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2023-12-13T11:42:37Z day: '20' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.5281/ZENODO.8059564 main_file_link: - open_access: '1' url: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8059564 month: '06' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version publisher: Zenodo related_material: record: - id: '13258' relation: used_in_publication status: public status: public title: 'kleshnina/stochgames_info: The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games' type: research_data_reference user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 year: '2023' ... --- _id: '9381' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'A game of rock-paper-scissors is an interesting example of an interaction where none of the pure strategies strictly dominates all others, leading to a cyclic pattern. In this work, we consider an unstable version of rock-paper-scissors dynamics and allow individuals to make behavioural mistakes during the strategy execution. We show that such an assumption can break a cyclic relationship leading to a stable equilibrium emerging with only one strategy surviving. We consider two cases: completely random mistakes when individuals have no bias towards any strategy and a general form of mistakes. Then, we determine conditions for a strategy to dominate all other strategies. However, given that individuals who adopt a dominating strategy are still prone to behavioural mistakes in the observed behaviour, we may still observe extinct strategies. That is, behavioural mistakes in strategy execution stabilise evolutionary dynamics leading to an evolutionary stable and, potentially, mixed co-existence equilibrium.' acknowledgement: Authors would like to thank Christian Hilbe and Martin Nowak for their inspiring and very helpful feedback on the manuscript. article_number: e1008523 article_processing_charge: No article_type: original author: - first_name: Maria full_name: Kleshnina, Maria id: 4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Kleshnina - first_name: Sabrina S. full_name: Streipert, Sabrina S. last_name: Streipert - first_name: Jerzy A. full_name: Filar, Jerzy A. last_name: Filar - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X citation: ama: Kleshnina M, Streipert SS, Filar JA, Chatterjee K. Mistakes can stabilise the dynamics of rock-paper-scissors games. PLoS Computational Biology. 2021;17(4). doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523 apa: Kleshnina, M., Streipert, S. S., Filar, J. A., & Chatterjee, K. (2021). Mistakes can stabilise the dynamics of rock-paper-scissors games. PLoS Computational Biology. Public Library of Science. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523 chicago: Kleshnina, Maria, Sabrina S. Streipert, Jerzy A. Filar, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Mistakes Can Stabilise the Dynamics of Rock-Paper-Scissors Games.” PLoS Computational Biology. Public Library of Science, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523. ieee: M. Kleshnina, S. S. Streipert, J. A. Filar, and K. Chatterjee, “Mistakes can stabilise the dynamics of rock-paper-scissors games,” PLoS Computational Biology, vol. 17, no. 4. Public Library of Science, 2021. ista: Kleshnina M, Streipert SS, Filar JA, Chatterjee K. 2021. Mistakes can stabilise the dynamics of rock-paper-scissors games. PLoS Computational Biology. 17(4), e1008523. mla: Kleshnina, Maria, et al. “Mistakes Can Stabilise the Dynamics of Rock-Paper-Scissors Games.” PLoS Computational Biology, vol. 17, no. 4, e1008523, Public Library of Science, 2021, doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523. short: M. Kleshnina, S.S. Streipert, J.A. Filar, K. Chatterjee, PLoS Computational Biology 17 (2021). date_created: 2021-05-09T22:01:38Z date_published: 2021-04-01T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2023-08-08T13:31:08Z day: '01' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '000639711200001' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: a94ebe0c4116f5047eaa6029e54d2dac content_type: application/pdf creator: kschuh date_created: 2021-05-11T13:50:06Z date_updated: 2021-05-11T13:50:06Z file_id: '9385' file_name: 2021_pcbi_Kleshnina.pdf file_size: 1323820 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2021-05-11T13:50:06Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 17' isi: 1 issue: '4' language: - iso: eng month: '04' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version project: - _id: 260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '754411' name: ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships - _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '863818' name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications' publication: PLoS Computational Biology publication_identifier: eissn: - '15537358' issn: - 1553734X publication_status: published publisher: Public Library of Science quality_controlled: '1' scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Mistakes can stabilise the dynamics of rock-paper-scissors games tmp: image: /images/cc_by.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0) short: CC BY (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8 volume: 17 year: '2021' ... --- _id: '8789' abstract: - lang: eng text: Cooperation is a ubiquitous and beneficial behavioural trait despite being prone to exploitation by free-riders. Hence, cooperative populations are prone to invasions by selfish individuals. However, a population consisting of only free-riders typically does not survive. Thus, cooperators and free-riders often coexist in some proportion. An evolutionary version of a Snowdrift Game proved its efficiency in analysing this phenomenon. However, what if the system has already reached its stable state but was perturbed due to a change in environmental conditions? Then, individuals may have to re-learn their effective strategies. To address this, we consider behavioural mistakes in strategic choice execution, which we refer to as incompetence. Parametrising the propensity to make such mistakes allows for a mathematical description of learning. We compare strategies based on their relative strategic advantage relying on both fitness and learning factors. When strategies are learned at distinct rates, allowing learning according to a prescribed order is optimal. Interestingly, the strategy with the lowest strategic advantage should be learnt first if we are to optimise fitness over the learning path. Then, the differences between strategies are balanced out in order to minimise the effect of behavioural uncertainty. acknowledgement: "This work was supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411, the Australian Research Council Discovery Grants DP160101236 and DP150100618, and the European Research Council Consolidator Grant 863818 (FoRM-SMArt).\r\nAuthors would like to thank Patrick McKinlay for his work on the preliminary results for this paper." article_number: '1945' article_processing_charge: No article_type: original author: - first_name: Maria full_name: Kleshnina, Maria id: 4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Kleshnina - first_name: Sabrina full_name: Streipert, Sabrina last_name: Streipert - first_name: Jerzy full_name: Filar, Jerzy last_name: Filar - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X citation: ama: Kleshnina M, Streipert S, Filar J, Chatterjee K. Prioritised learning in snowdrift-type games. Mathematics. 2020;8(11). doi:10.3390/math8111945 apa: Kleshnina, M., Streipert, S., Filar, J., & Chatterjee, K. (2020). Prioritised learning in snowdrift-type games. Mathematics. MDPI. https://doi.org/10.3390/math8111945 chicago: Kleshnina, Maria, Sabrina Streipert, Jerzy Filar, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Prioritised Learning in Snowdrift-Type Games.” Mathematics. MDPI, 2020. https://doi.org/10.3390/math8111945. ieee: M. Kleshnina, S. Streipert, J. Filar, and K. Chatterjee, “Prioritised learning in snowdrift-type games,” Mathematics, vol. 8, no. 11. MDPI, 2020. ista: Kleshnina M, Streipert S, Filar J, Chatterjee K. 2020. Prioritised learning in snowdrift-type games. Mathematics. 8(11), 1945. mla: Kleshnina, Maria, et al. “Prioritised Learning in Snowdrift-Type Games.” Mathematics, vol. 8, no. 11, 1945, MDPI, 2020, doi:10.3390/math8111945. short: M. Kleshnina, S. Streipert, J. Filar, K. Chatterjee, Mathematics 8 (2020). date_created: 2020-11-22T23:01:24Z date_published: 2020-11-04T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2023-08-22T13:25:45Z day: '04' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.3390/math8111945 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '000593962100001' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 61cfcc3b35760656ce7a9385a4ace5d2 content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2020-11-23T13:06:30Z date_updated: 2020-11-23T13:06:30Z file_id: '8797' file_name: 2020_Mathematics_Kleshnina.pdf file_size: 565191 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2020-11-23T13:06:30Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 8' isi: 1 issue: '11' language: - iso: eng month: '11' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version project: - _id: 260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '754411' name: ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships - _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '863818' name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications' publication: Mathematics publication_identifier: eissn: - '22277390' publication_status: published publisher: MDPI quality_controlled: '1' scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Prioritised learning in snowdrift-type games tmp: image: /images/cc_by.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0) short: CC BY (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8 volume: 8 year: '2020' ...