@inproceedings{6884,
abstract = {In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce a finite or infinite path, which determines the qualitative winner or quantitative payoff of the game. We study bidding games in which the players bid for the right to move the token. Several bidding rules were studied previously. In Richman bidding, in each round, the players simultaneously submit bids, and the higher bidder moves the token and pays the other player. Poorman bidding is similar except that the winner of the bidding pays the "bank" rather than the other player. Taxman bidding spans the spectrum between Richman and poorman bidding. They are parameterized by a constant tau in [0,1]: portion tau of the winning bid is paid to the other player, and portion 1-tau to the bank. While finite-duration (reachability) taxman games have been studied before, we present, for the first time, results on infinite-duration taxman games. It was previously shown that both Richman and poorman infinite-duration games with qualitative objectives reduce to reachability games, and we show a similar result here. Our most interesting results concern quantitative taxman games, namely mean-payoff games, where poorman and Richman bidding differ significantly. A central quantity in these games is the ratio between the two players' initial budgets. While in poorman mean-payoff games, the optimal payoff of a player depends on the initial ratio, in Richman bidding, the payoff depends only on the structure of the game. In both games the optimal payoffs can be found using (different) probabilistic connections with random-turn games in which in each turn, instead of bidding, a coin is tossed to determine which player moves. While the value with Richman bidding equals the value of a random-turn game with an un-biased coin, with poorman bidding, the bias in the coin is the initial ratio of the budgets. We give a complete classification of mean-payoff taxman games that is based on a probabilistic connection: the value of a taxman bidding game with parameter tau and initial ratio r, equals the value of a random-turn game that uses a coin with bias F(tau, r) = (r+tau * (1-r))/(1+tau). Thus, we show that Richman bidding is the exception; namely, for every tau <1, the value of the game depends on the initial ratio. Our proof technique simplifies and unifies the previous proof techniques for both Richman and poorman bidding. },
author = {Avni, Guy and Henzinger, Thomas A and Zikelic, Dorde},
location = {Aachen, Germany},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik},
title = {{Bidding mechanisms in graph games}},
doi = {10.4230/LIPICS.MFCS.2019.11},
volume = {138},
year = {2019},
}
@inproceedings{6822,
abstract = {In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the qualitative winner or quantitative payoff of the game. In bidding games, in each turn, we hold an auction between the two players to determine which player moves the token. Bidding games have largely been studied with concrete bidding mechanisms that are variants of a first-price auction: in each turn both players simultaneously submit bids, the higher
bidder moves the token, and pays his bid to the lower bidder in Richman bidding, to the bank in poorman bidding, and in taxman bidding, the bid is split between the other player and the bank according to a predefined constant factor. Bidding games are deterministic games. They have an intriguing connection with a fragment of stochastic games called
randomturn games. We study, for the first time, a combination of bidding games with probabilistic behavior; namely, we study bidding games that are played on Markov decision processes, where the players bid for the right to choose the next action, which determines the probability distribution according to which the next vertex is chosen. We study parity and meanpayoff bidding games on MDPs and extend results from the deterministic bidding setting to the probabilistic one.},
author = {Avni, Guy and Henzinger, Thomas A and Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus and Novotny, Petr},
booktitle = { Proceedings of the 13th International Conference of Reachability Problems},
isbn = {978-303030805-6},
issn = {0302-9743},
location = {Brussels, Belgium},
pages = {1--12},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Bidding games on Markov decision processes}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-30806-3_1},
volume = {11674},
year = {2019},
}
@article{6752,
abstract = {Two-player games on graphs are widely studied in formal methods, as they model the interaction between a system and its environment. The game is played by moving a token throughout a graph to produce an infinite path. There are several common modes to determine how the players move the token through the graph; e.g., in turn-based games the players alternate turns in moving the token. We study the bidding mode of moving the token, which, to the best of our knowledge, has never been studied in infinite-duration games. The following bidding rule was previously defined and called Richman bidding. Both players have separate budgets, which sum up to 1. In each turn, a bidding takes place: Both players submit bids simultaneously, where a bid is legal if it does not exceed the available budget, and the higher bidder pays his bid to the other player and moves the token. The central question studied in bidding games is a necessary and sufficient initial budget for winning the game: a threshold budget in a vertex is a value t ∈ [0, 1] such that if Player 1’s budget exceeds t, he can win the game; and if Player 2’s budget exceeds 1 − t, he can win the game. Threshold budgets were previously shown to exist in every vertex of a reachability game, which have an interesting connection with random-turn games—a sub-class of simple stochastic games in which the player who moves is chosen randomly. We show the existence of threshold budgets for a qualitative class of infinite-duration games, namely parity games, and a quantitative class, namely mean-payoff games. The key component of the proof is a quantitative solution to strongly connected mean-payoff bidding games in which we extend the connection with random-turn games to these games, and construct explicit optimal strategies for both players.},
author = {Avni, Guy and Henzinger, Thomas A and Chonev, Ventsislav K},
issn = {1557735X},
journal = {Journal of the ACM},
number = {4},
publisher = {ACM},
title = {{Infinite-duration bidding games}},
doi = {10.1145/3340295},
volume = {66},
year = {2019},
}
@inproceedings{6462,
abstract = {A controller is a device that interacts with a plant. At each time point,it reads the plant’s state and issues commands with the goal that the plant oper-ates optimally. Constructing optimal controllers is a fundamental and challengingproblem. Machine learning techniques have recently been successfully applied totrain controllers, yet they have limitations. Learned controllers are monolithic andhard to reason about. In particular, it is difficult to add features without retraining,to guarantee any level of performance, and to achieve acceptable performancewhen encountering untrained scenarios. These limitations can be addressed bydeploying quantitative run-timeshieldsthat serve as a proxy for the controller.At each time point, the shield reads the command issued by the controller andmay choose to alter it before passing it on to the plant. We show how optimalshields that interfere as little as possible while guaranteeing a desired level ofcontroller performance, can be generated systematically and automatically usingreactive synthesis. First, we abstract the plant by building a stochastic model.Second, we consider the learned controller to be a black box. Third, we mea-surecontroller performanceandshield interferenceby two quantitative run-timemeasures that are formally defined using weighted automata. Then, the problemof constructing a shield that guarantees maximal performance with minimal inter-ference is the problem of finding an optimal strategy in a stochastic2-player game“controller versus shield” played on the abstract state space of the plant with aquantitative objective obtained from combining the performance and interferencemeasures. We illustrate the effectiveness of our approach by automatically con-structing lightweight shields for learned traffic-light controllers in various roadnetworks. The shields we generate avoid liveness bugs, improve controller per-formance in untrained and changing traffic situations, and add features to learnedcontrollers, such as giving priority to emergency vehicles.},
author = {Avni, Guy and Bloem, Roderick and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Henzinger, Thomas A and Konighofer, Bettina and Pranger, Stefan},
booktitle = {31st International Conference on Computer-Aided Verification},
isbn = {9783030255398},
issn = {0302-9743},
location = {New York, NY, United States},
pages = {630--649},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Run-time optimization for learned controllers through quantitative games}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-25540-4_36},
volume = {11561},
year = {2019},
}
@inproceedings{6886,
abstract = {In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner of the game. Such games are central in formal methods since they model the interaction between a non-terminating system and its environment. In bidding games the players bid for the right to move the token: in each round, the players simultaneously submit bids, and the higher bidder moves the token and pays the other player. Bidding games are known to have a clean and elegant mathematical structure that relies on the ability of the players to submit arbitrarily small bids. Many applications, however, require a fixed granularity for the bids, which can represent, for example, the monetary value expressed in cents. We study, for the first time, the combination of discrete-bidding and infinite-duration games. Our most important result proves that these games form a large determined subclass of concurrent games, where determinacy is the strong property that there always exists exactly one player who can guarantee winning the game. In particular, we show that, in contrast to non-discrete bidding games, the mechanism with which tied bids are resolved plays an important role in discrete-bidding games. We study several natural tie-breaking mechanisms and show that, while some do not admit determinacy, most natural mechanisms imply determinacy for every pair of initial budgets. },
author = {Aghajohari, Milad and Avni, Guy and Henzinger, Thomas A},
location = {Amsterdam, Netherlands},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik},
title = {{Determinacy in discrete-bidding infinite-duration games}},
doi = {10.4230/LIPICS.CONCUR.2019.20},
volume = {140},
year = {2019},
}
@article{6761,
abstract = {In resource allocation games, selfish players share resources that are needed in order to fulfill their objectives. The cost of using a resource depends on the load on it. In the traditional setting, the players make their choices concurrently and in one-shot. That is, a strategy for a player is a subset of the resources. We introduce and study dynamic resource allocation games. In this setting, the game proceeds in phases. In each phase each player chooses one resource. A scheduler dictates the order in which the players proceed in a phase, possibly scheduling several players to proceed concurrently. The game ends when each player has collected a set of resources that fulfills his objective. The cost for each player then depends on this set as well as on the load on the resources in it – we consider both congestion and cost-sharing games. We argue that the dynamic setting is the suitable setting for many applications in practice. We study the stability of dynamic resource allocation games, where the appropriate notion of stability is that of subgame perfect equilibrium, study the inefficiency incurred due to selfish behavior, and also study problems that are particular to the dynamic setting, like constraints on the order in which resources can be chosen or the problem of finding a scheduler that achieves stability.},
author = {Avni, Guy and Henzinger, Thomas A and Kupferman, Orna},
issn = {03043975},
journal = {Theoretical Computer Science},
publisher = {Elsevier},
title = {{Dynamic resource allocation games}},
doi = {10.1016/j.tcs.2019.06.031},
year = {2019},
}
@inproceedings{5788,
abstract = {In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner or payoff of the game. Such games are central in formal verification since they model the interaction between a non-terminating system and its environment. We study bidding games in which the players bid for the right to move the token. Two bidding rules have been defined. In Richman bidding, in each round, the players simultaneously submit bids, and the higher bidder moves the token and pays the other player. Poorman bidding is similar except that the winner of the bidding pays the “bank” rather than the other player. While poorman reachability games have been studied before, we present, for the first time, results on infinite-duration poorman games. A central quantity in these games is the ratio between the two players’ initial budgets. The questions we study concern a necessary and sufficient ratio with which a player can achieve a goal. For reachability objectives, such threshold ratios are known to exist for both bidding rules. We show that the properties of poorman reachability games extend to complex qualitative objectives such as parity, similarly to the Richman case. Our most interesting results concern quantitative poorman games, namely poorman mean-payoff games, where we construct optimal strategies depending on the initial ratio, by showing a connection with random-turn based games. The connection in itself is interesting, because it does not hold for reachability poorman games. We also solve the complexity problems that arise in poorman bidding games.},
author = {Avni, Guy and Henzinger, Thomas A and Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus},
isbn = {9783030046118},
issn = {03029743},
location = {Oxford, UK},
pages = {21--36},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Infinite-duration poorman-bidding games}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_2},
volume = {11316},
year = {2018},
}
@inproceedings{6005,
abstract = {Network games are widely used as a model for selfish resource-allocation problems. In the classicalmodel, each player selects a path connecting her source and target vertices. The cost of traversingan edge depends on theload; namely, number of players that traverse it. Thus, it abstracts the factthat different users may use a resource at different times and for different durations, which playsan important role in determining the costs of the users in reality. For example, when transmittingpackets in a communication network, routing traffic in a road network, or processing a task in aproduction system, actual sharing and congestion of resources crucially depends on time.In [13], we introducedtimed network games, which add a time component to network games.Each vertexvin the network is associated with a cost function, mapping the load onvto theprice that a player pays for staying invfor one time unit with this load. Each edge in thenetwork is guarded by the time intervals in which it can be traversed, which forces the players tospend time in the vertices. In this work we significantly extend the way time can be referred toin timed network games. In the model we study, the network is equipped withclocks, and, as intimed automata, edges are guarded by constraints on the values of the clocks, and their traversalmay involve a reset of some clocks. We argue that the stronger model captures many realisticnetworks. The addition of clocks breaks the techniques we developed in [13] and we developnew techniques in order to show that positive results on classic network games carry over to thestronger timed setting.},
author = {Avni, Guy and Guha, Shibashis and Kupferman, Orna},
location = {Liverpool, United Kingdom},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik},
title = {{Timed network games with clocks}},
doi = {10.4230/LIPICS.MFCS.2018.23},
volume = {117},
year = {2018},
}
@article{608,
abstract = {Synthesis is the automated construction of a system from its specification. In real life, hardware and software systems are rarely constructed from scratch. Rather, a system is typically constructed from a library of components. Lustig and Vardi formalized this intuition and studied LTL synthesis from component libraries. In real life, designers seek optimal systems. In this paper we add optimality considerations to the setting. We distinguish between quality considerations (for example, size - the smaller a system is, the better it is), and pricing (for example, the payment to the company who manufactured the component). We study the problem of designing systems with minimal quality-cost and price. A key point is that while the quality cost is individual - the choices of a designer are independent of choices made by other designers that use the same library, pricing gives rise to a resource-allocation game - designers that use the same component share its price, with the share being proportional to the number of uses (a component can be used several times in a design). We study both closed and open settings, and in both we solve the problem of finding an optimal design. In a setting with multiple designers, we also study the game-theoretic problems of the induced resource-allocation game.},
author = {Avni, Guy and Kupferman, Orna},
journal = {Theoretical Computer Science},
pages = {50 -- 72},
publisher = {Elsevier},
title = {{Synthesis from component libraries with costs}},
doi = {10.1016/j.tcs.2017.11.001},
volume = {712},
year = {2018},
}
@article{6006,
abstract = {Network games (NGs) are played on directed graphs and are extensively used in network design and analysis. Search problems for NGs include finding special strategy profiles such as a Nash equilibrium and a globally-optimal solution. The networks modeled by NGs may be huge. In formal verification, abstraction has proven to be an extremely effective technique for reasoning about systems with big and even infinite state spaces. We describe an abstraction-refinement methodology for reasoning about NGs. Our methodology is based on an abstraction function that maps the state space of an NG to a much smaller state space. We search for a global optimum and a Nash equilibrium by reasoning on an under- and an over-approximation defined on top of this smaller state space. When the approximations are too coarse to find such profiles, we refine the abstraction function. We extend the abstraction-refinement methodology to labeled networks, where the objectives of the players are regular languages. Our experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the methodology. },
author = {Avni, Guy and Guha, Shibashis and Kupferman, Orna},
issn = {2073-4336},
journal = {Games},
number = {3},
publisher = {MDPI AG},
title = {{An abstraction-refinement methodology for reasoning about network games}},
doi = {10.3390/g9030039},
volume = {9},
year = {2018},
}
@inproceedings{1116,
abstract = {Time-triggered switched networks are a deterministic communication infrastructure used by real-time distributed embedded systems. Due to the criticality of the applications running over them, developers need to ensure that end-to-end communication is dependable and predictable. Traditional approaches assume static networks that are not flexible to changes caused by reconfigurations or, more importantly, faults, which are dealt with in the application using redundancy. We adopt the concept of handling faults in the switches from non-real-time networks while maintaining the required predictability.
We study a class of forwarding schemes that can handle various types of failures. We consider probabilistic failures. We study a class of forwarding schemes that can handle various types of failures. We consider probabilistic failures. For a given network with a forwarding scheme and a constant ℓ, we compute the {\em score} of the scheme, namely the probability (induced by faults) that at least ℓ messages arrive on time. We reduce the scoring problem to a reachability problem on a Markov chain with a "product-like" structure. Its special structure allows us to reason about it symbolically, and reduce the scoring problem to #SAT. Our solution is generic and can be adapted to different networks and other contexts. Also, we show the computational complexity of the scoring problem is #P-complete, and we study methods to estimate the score. We evaluate the effectiveness of our techniques with an implementation. },
author = {Avni, Guy and Goel, Shubham and Henzinger, Thomas A and Rodríguez Navas, Guillermo},
issn = {03029743},
location = {Uppsala, Sweden},
pages = {169 -- 187},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Computing scores of forwarding schemes in switched networks with probabilistic faults}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-54580-5_10},
volume = {10206},
year = {2017},
}
@inproceedings{1003,
abstract = {Network games (NGs) are played on directed graphs and are extensively used in network design and analysis. Search problems for NGs include finding special strategy profiles such as a Nash equilibrium and a globally optimal solution. The networks modeled by NGs may be huge. In formal verification, abstraction has proven to be an extremely effective technique for reasoning about systems with big and even infinite state spaces. We describe an abstraction-refinement methodology for reasoning about NGs. Our methodology is based on an abstraction function that maps the state space of an NG to a much smaller state space. We search for a global optimum and a Nash equilibrium by reasoning on an under- and an overapproximation defined on top of this smaller state space. When the approximations are too coarse to find such profiles, we refine the abstraction function. Our experimental results demonstrate the efficiency of the methodology.},
author = {Avni, Guy and Guha, Shibashis and Kupferman, Orna},
issn = {10450823},
location = {Melbourne, Australia},
pages = {70 -- 76},
publisher = {AAAI Press},
title = {{An abstraction-refinement methodology for reasoning about network games}},
doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2017/11},
year = {2017},
}
@inproceedings{950,
abstract = {Two-player games on graphs are widely studied in formal methods as they model the interaction between a system and its environment. The game is played by moving a token throughout a graph to produce an infinite path. There are several common modes to determine how the players move the token through the graph; e.g., in turn-based games the players alternate turns in moving the token. We study the bidding mode of moving the token, which, to the best of our knowledge, has never been studied in infinite-duration games. Both players have separate budgets, which sum up to $1$. In each turn, a bidding takes place. Both players submit bids simultaneously, and a bid is legal if it does not exceed the available budget. The winner of the bidding pays his bid to the other player and moves the token. For reachability objectives, repeated bidding games have been studied and are called Richman games. There, a central question is the existence and computation of threshold budgets; namely, a value t\in [0,1] such that if\PO's budget exceeds $t$, he can win the game, and if\PT's budget exceeds 1-t, he can win the game. We focus on parity games and mean-payoff games. We show the existence of threshold budgets in these games, and reduce the problem of finding them to Richman games. We also determine the strategy-complexity of an optimal strategy. Our most interesting result shows that memoryless strategies suffice for mean-payoff bidding games.
},
author = {Avni, Guy and Henzinger, Thomas A and Chonev, Ventsislav K},
issn = {1868-8969},
location = {Berlin, Germany},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik},
title = {{Infinite-duration bidding games}},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2017.21},
volume = {85},
year = {2017},
}
@inproceedings{963,
abstract = {Network games are widely used as a model for selfish resource-allocation problems. In the classical model, each player selects a path connecting her source and target vertex. The cost of traversing an edge depends on the number of players that traverse it. Thus, it abstracts the fact that different users may use a resource at different times and for different durations, which plays an important role in defining the costs of the users in reality. For example, when transmitting packets in a communication network, routing traffic in a road network, or processing a task in a production system, the traversal of the network involves an inherent delay, and so sharing and congestion of resources crucially depends on time. We study timed network games , which add a time component to network games. Each vertex v in the network is associated with a cost function, mapping the load on v to the price that a player pays for staying in v for one time unit with this load. In addition, each edge has a guard, describing time intervals in which the edge can be traversed, forcing the players to spend time on vertices. Unlike earlier work that add a time component to network games, the time in our model is continuous and cannot be discretized. In particular, players have uncountably many strategies, and a game may have uncountably many pure Nash equilibria. We study properties of timed network games with cost-sharing or congestion cost functions: their stability, equilibrium inefficiency, and complexity. In particular, we show that the answer to the question whether we can restrict attention to boundary strategies, namely ones in which edges are traversed only at the boundaries of guards, is mixed. },
author = {Avni, Guy and Guha, Shibashis and Kupferman, Orna},
issn = {18688969},
location = {Aalborg, Denmark},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik},
title = {{Timed network games with clocks}},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2017.37},
volume = {83},
year = {2017},
}
@inproceedings{1135,
abstract = {Time-triggered (TT) switched networks are a deterministic communication infrastructure used by real-time distributed embedded systems. These networks rely on the notion of globally discretized time (i.e. time slots) and a static TT schedule that prescribes which message is sent through which link at every time slot, such that all messages reach their destination before a global timeout. These schedules are generated offline, assuming a static network with fault-free links, and entrusting all error-handling functions to the end user. Assuming the network is static is an over-optimistic view, and indeed links tend to fail in practice. We study synthesis of TT schedules on a network in which links fail over time and we assume the switches run a very simple error-recovery protocol once they detect a crashed link. We address the problem of finding a pk; qresistant schedule; namely, one that, assuming the switches run a fixed error-recovery protocol, guarantees that the number of messages that arrive at their destination by the timeout is at least no matter what sequence of at most k links fail. Thus, we maintain the simplicity of the switches while giving a guarantee on the number of messages that meet the timeout. We show how a pk; q-resistant schedule can be obtained using a CEGAR-like approach: find a schedule, decide whether it is pk; q-resistant, and if it is not, use the witnessing fault sequence to generate a constraint that is added to the program. The newly added constraint disallows the schedule to be regenerated in a future iteration while also eliminating several other schedules that are not pk; q-resistant. We illustrate the applicability of our approach using an SMT-based implementation. © 2016 ACM.},
author = {Avni, Guy and Guha, Shibashis and Rodríguez Navas, Guillermo},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Embedded Software },
location = {Pittsburgh, PA, USA},
publisher = {ACM},
title = {{Synthesizing time triggered schedules for switched networks with faulty links}},
doi = {10.1145/2968478.2968499},
year = {2016},
}
@inproceedings{1341,
abstract = {In resource allocation games, selfish players share resources that are needed in order to fulfill their objectives. The cost of using a resource depends on the load on it. In the traditional setting, the players make their choices concurrently and in one-shot. That is, a strategy for a player is a subset of the resources. We introduce and study dynamic resource allocation games. In this setting, the game proceeds in phases. In each phase each player chooses one resource. A scheduler dictates the order in which the players proceed in a phase, possibly scheduling several players to proceed concurrently. The game ends when each player has collected a set of resources that fulfills his objective. The cost for each player then depends on this set as well as on the load on the resources in it – we consider both congestion and cost-sharing games. We argue that the dynamic setting is the suitable setting for many applications in practice. We study the stability of dynamic resource allocation games, where the appropriate notion of stability is that of subgame perfect equilibrium, study the inefficiency incurred due to selfish behavior, and also study problems that are particular to the dynamic setting, like constraints on the order in which resources can be chosen or the problem of finding a scheduler that achieves stability.},
author = {Avni, Guy and Henzinger, Thomas A and Kupferman, Orna},
location = {Liverpool, United Kingdom},
pages = {153 -- 166},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Dynamic resource allocation games}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_13},
volume = {9928},
year = {2016},
}