@article{1642,
abstract = {The Hanani-Tutte theorem is a classical result proved for the first time in the 1930s that characterizes planar graphs as graphs that admit a drawing in the plane in which every pair of edges not sharing a vertex cross an even number of times. We generalize this result to clustered graphs with two disjoint clusters, and show that a straightforward extension to flat clustered graphs with three or more disjoint clusters is not possible. For general clustered graphs we show a variant of the Hanani-Tutte theorem in the case when each cluster induces a connected subgraph. Di Battista and Frati proved that clustered planarity of embedded clustered graphs whose every face is incident to at most five vertices can be tested in polynomial time. We give a new and short proof of this result, using the matroid intersection algorithm.},
author = {Fulek, Radoslav and Kynčl, Jan and Malinovič, Igor and Pálvölgyi, Dömötör},
journal = {Electronic Journal of Combinatorics},
number = {4},
publisher = {Electronic Journal of Combinatorics},
title = {{Clustered planarity testing revisited}},
volume = {22},
year = {2015},
}
@inproceedings{1644,
abstract = {Increasing the computational complexity of evaluating a hash function, both for the honest users as well as for an adversary, is a useful technique employed for example in password-based cryptographic schemes to impede brute-force attacks, and also in so-called proofs of work (used in protocols like Bitcoin) to show that a certain amount of computation was performed by a legitimate user. A natural approach to adjust the complexity of a hash function is to iterate it c times, for some parameter c, in the hope that any query to the scheme requires c evaluations of the underlying hash function. However, results by Dodis et al. (Crypto 2012) imply that plain iteration falls short of achieving this goal, and designing schemes which provably have such a desirable property remained an open problem. This paper formalizes explicitly what it means for a given scheme to amplify the query complexity of a hash function. In the random oracle model, the goal of a secure query-complexity amplifier (QCA) scheme is captured as transforming, in the sense of indifferentiability, a random oracle allowing R queries (for the adversary) into one provably allowing only r < R queries. Turned around, this means that making r queries to the scheme requires at least R queries to the actual random oracle. Second, a new scheme, called collision-free iteration, is proposed and proven to achieve c-fold QCA for both the honest parties and the adversary, for any fixed parameter c.},
author = {Demay, Grégory and Gazi, Peter and Maurer, Ueli and Tackmann, Björn},
location = {Lugano, Switzerland},
pages = {159 -- 180},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Query-complexity amplification for random oracles}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-17470-9_10},
volume = {9063},
year = {2015},
}
@inproceedings{1645,
abstract = {Secret-key constructions are often proved secure in a model where one or more underlying components are replaced by an idealized oracle accessible to the attacker. This model gives rise to information-theoretic security analyses, and several advances have been made in this area over the last few years. This paper provides a systematic overview of what is achievable in this model, and how existing works fit into this view.},
author = {Gazi, Peter and Tessaro, Stefano},
booktitle = {2015 IEEE Information Theory Workshop},
location = {Jerusalem, Israel},
publisher = {IEEE},
title = {{Secret-key cryptography from ideal primitives: A systematic verview}},
doi = {10.1109/ITW.2015.7133163},
year = {2015},
}
@inproceedings{1646,
abstract = {A pseudorandom function (PRF) is a keyed function F : K × X → Y where, for a random key k ∈ K, the function F(k, ·) is indistinguishable from a uniformly random function, given black-box access. A key-homomorphic PRF has the additional feature that for any keys k, k' and any input x, we have F(k+k', x) = F(k, x)⊕F(k', x) for some group operations +,⊕ on K and Y, respectively. A constrained PRF for a family of setsS ⊆ P(X) has the property that, given any key k and set S ∈ S, one can efficiently compute a “constrained” key kS that enables evaluation of F(k, x) on all inputs x ∈ S, while the values F(k, x) for x /∈ S remain pseudorandom even given kS. In this paper we construct PRFs that are simultaneously constrained and key homomorphic, where the homomorphic property holds even for constrained keys. We first show that the multilinear map-based bit-fixing and circuit-constrained PRFs of Boneh and Waters (Asiacrypt 2013) can be modified to also be keyhomomorphic. We then show that the LWE-based key-homomorphic PRFs of Banerjee and Peikert (Crypto 2014) are essentially already prefix-constrained PRFs, using a (non-obvious) definition of constrained keys and associated group operation. Moreover, the constrained keys themselves are pseudorandom, and the constraining and evaluation functions can all be computed in low depth. As an application of key-homomorphic constrained PRFs,we construct a proxy re-encryption schemewith fine-grained access control. This scheme allows storing encrypted data on an untrusted server, where each file can be encrypted relative to some attributes, so that only parties whose constrained keys match the attributes can decrypt. Moreover, the server can re-key (arbitrary subsets of) the ciphertexts without learning anything about the plaintexts, thus permitting efficient and finegrained revocation.},
author = {Banerjee, Abishek and Fuchsbauer, Georg and Peikert, Chris and Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z and Stevens, Sophie},
location = {Warsaw, Poland},
pages = {31 -- 60},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Key-homomorphic constrained pseudorandom functions}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-46497-7_2},
volume = {9015},
year = {2015},
}
@inproceedings{1647,
abstract = {Round-optimal blind signatures are notoriously hard to construct in the standard model, especially in the malicious-signer model, where blindness must hold under adversarially chosen keys. This is substantiated by several impossibility results. The only construction that can be termed theoretically efficient, by Garg and Gupta (Eurocrypt’14), requires complexity leveraging, inducing an exponential security loss. We present a construction of practically efficient round-optimal blind signatures in the standard model. It is conceptually simple and builds on the recent structure-preserving signatures on equivalence classes (SPSEQ) from Asiacrypt’14. While the traditional notion of blindness follows from standard assumptions, we prove blindness under adversarially chosen keys under an interactive variant of DDH. However, we neither require non-uniform assumptions nor complexity leveraging. We then show how to extend our construction to partially blind signatures and to blind signatures on message vectors, which yield a construction of one-show anonymous credentials à la “anonymous credentials light” (CCS’13) in the standard model. Furthermore, we give the first SPS-EQ construction under noninteractive assumptions and show how SPS-EQ schemes imply conventional structure-preserving signatures, which allows us to apply optimality results for the latter to SPS-EQ.},
author = {Fuchsbauer, Georg and Hanser, Christian and Slamanig, Daniel},
location = {Santa Barbara, CA, United States},
pages = {233 -- 253},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Practical round-optimal blind signatures in the standard model}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_12},
volume = {9216},
year = {2015},
}
@inproceedings{1648,
abstract = {Generalized Selective Decryption (GSD), introduced by Panjwani [TCC’07], is a game for a symmetric encryption scheme Enc that captures the difficulty of proving adaptive security of certain protocols, most notably the Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) multicast encryption protocol. In the GSD game there are n keys k1,..., kn, which the adversary may adaptively corrupt (learn); moreover, it can ask for encryptions Encki (kj) of keys under other keys. The adversary’s task is to distinguish keys (which it cannot trivially compute) from random. Proving the hardness of GSD assuming only IND-CPA security of Enc is surprisingly hard. Using “complexity leveraging” loses a factor exponential in n, which makes the proof practically meaningless. We can think of the GSD game as building a graph on n vertices, where we add an edge i → j when the adversary asks for an encryption of kj under ki. If restricted to graphs of depth ℓ, Panjwani gave a reduction that loses only a factor exponential in ℓ (not n). To date, this is the only non-trivial result known for GSD. In this paper we give almost-polynomial reductions for large classes of graphs. Most importantly, we prove the security of the GSD game restricted to trees losing only a quasi-polynomial factor n3 log n+5. Trees are an important special case capturing real-world protocols like the LKH protocol. Our new bound improves upon Panjwani’s on some LKH variants proposed in the literature where the underlying tree is not balanced. Our proof builds on ideas from the “nested hybrids” technique recently introduced by Fuchsbauer et al. [Asiacrypt’14] for proving the adaptive security of constrained PRFs.},
author = {Fuchsbauer, Georg and Jafargholi, Zahra and Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z},
location = {Santa Barbara, CA, USA},
pages = {601 -- 620},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{A quasipolynomial reduction for generalized selective decryption on trees}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_29},
volume = {9215},
year = {2015},
}
@inproceedings{1649,
abstract = {We extend a commitment scheme based on the learning with errors over rings (RLWE) problem, and present efficient companion zeroknowledge proofs of knowledge. Our scheme maps elements from the ring (or equivalently, n elements from },
author = {Benhamouda, Fabrice and Krenn, Stephan and Lyubashevsky, Vadim and Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z},
location = {Vienna, Austria},
pages = {305 -- 325},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Efficient zero-knowledge proofs for commitments from learning with errors over rings}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_16},
volume = {9326},
year = {2015},
}
@inproceedings{1650,
abstract = {We consider the task of deriving a key with high HILL entropy (i.e., being computationally indistinguishable from a key with high min-entropy) from an unpredictable source.
Previous to this work, the only known way to transform unpredictability into a key that was ϵ indistinguishable from having min-entropy was via pseudorandomness, for example by Goldreich-Levin (GL) hardcore bits. This approach has the inherent limitation that from a source with k bits of unpredictability entropy one can derive a key of length (and thus HILL entropy) at most k−2log(1/ϵ) bits. In many settings, e.g. when dealing with biometric data, such a 2log(1/ϵ) bit entropy loss in not an option. Our main technical contribution is a theorem that states that in the high entropy regime, unpredictability implies HILL entropy. Concretely, any variable K with |K|−d bits of unpredictability entropy has the same amount of so called metric entropy (against real-valued, deterministic distinguishers), which is known to imply the same amount of HILL entropy. The loss in circuit size in this argument is exponential in the entropy gap d, and thus this result only applies for small d (i.e., where the size of distinguishers considered is exponential in d).
To overcome the above restriction, we investigate if it’s possible to first “condense” unpredictability entropy and make the entropy gap small. We show that any source with k bits of unpredictability can be condensed into a source of length k with k−3 bits of unpredictability entropy. Our condenser simply “abuses" the GL construction and derives a k bit key from a source with k bits of unpredicatibily. The original GL theorem implies nothing when extracting that many bits, but we show that in this regime, GL still behaves like a “condenser" for unpredictability. This result comes with two caveats (1) the loss in circuit size is exponential in k and (2) we require that the source we start with has no HILL entropy (equivalently, one can efficiently check if a guess is correct). We leave it as an intriguing open problem to overcome these restrictions or to prove they’re inherent.},
author = {Skórski, Maciej and Golovnev, Alexander and Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z},
location = {Kyoto, Japan},
pages = {1046 -- 1057},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Condensed unpredictability }},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-47672-7_85},
volume = {9134},
year = {2015},
}
@inproceedings{1651,
abstract = {Cryptographic e-cash allows off-line electronic transactions between a bank, users and merchants in a secure and anonymous fashion. A plethora of e-cash constructions has been proposed in the literature; however, these traditional e-cash schemes only allow coins to be transferred once between users and merchants. Ideally, we would like users to be able to transfer coins between each other multiple times before deposit, as happens with physical cash. “Transferable” e-cash schemes are the solution to this problem. Unfortunately, the currently proposed schemes are either completely impractical or do not achieve the desirable anonymity properties without compromises, such as assuming the existence of a trusted “judge” who can trace all coins and users in the system. This paper presents the first efficient and fully anonymous transferable e-cash scheme without any trusted third parties. We start by revising the security and anonymity properties of transferable e-cash to capture issues that were previously overlooked. For our construction we use the recently proposed malleable signatures by Chase et al. to allow the secure and anonymous transfer of coins, combined with a new efficient double-spending detection mechanism. Finally, we discuss an instantiation of our construction.},
author = {Baldimtsi, Foteini and Chase, Melissa and Fuchsbauer, Georg and Kohlweiss, Markulf},
location = {Gaithersburg, MD, USA},
pages = {101 -- 124},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Anonymous transferable e-cash}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_5},
volume = {9020},
year = {2015},
}
@inproceedings{1652,
abstract = {We develop new theoretical tools for proving lower-bounds on the (amortized) complexity of certain functions in models of parallel computation. We apply the tools to construct a class of functions with high amortized memory complexity in the parallel Random Oracle Model (pROM); a variant of the standard ROM allowing for batches of simultaneous queries. In particular we obtain a new, more robust, type of Memory-Hard Functions (MHF); a security primitive which has recently been gaining acceptance in practice as an effective means of countering brute-force attacks on security relevant functions. Along the way we also demonstrate an important shortcoming of previous definitions of MHFs and give a new definition addressing the problem. The tools we develop represent an adaptation of the powerful pebbling paradigm (initially introduced by Hewitt and Paterson [HP70] and Cook [Coo73]) to a simple and intuitive parallel setting. We define a simple pebbling game Gp over graphs which aims to abstract parallel computation in an intuitive way. As a conceptual contribution we define a measure of pebbling complexity for graphs called cumulative complexity (CC) and show how it overcomes a crucial shortcoming (in the parallel setting) exhibited by more traditional complexity measures used in the past. As a main technical contribution we give an explicit construction of a constant in-degree family of graphs whose CC in Gp approaches maximality to within a polylogarithmic factor for any graph of equal size (analogous to the graphs of Tarjan et. al. [PTC76, LT82] for sequential pebbling games). Finally, for a given graph G and related function fG, we derive a lower-bound on the amortized memory complexity of fG in the pROM in terms of the CC of G in the game Gp.},
author = {Alwen, Joel F and Serbinenko, Vladimir},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 47th annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing},
location = {Portland, OR, United States},
pages = {595 -- 603},
publisher = {ACM},
title = {{High parallel complexity graphs and memory-hard functions}},
doi = {10.1145/2746539.2746622},
year = {2015},
}