TY - JOUR AB - Direct and indirect reciprocity are key mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Direct reciprocity means that individuals use their own experience to decide whether to cooperate with another person. Indirect reciprocity means that they also consider the experiences of others. Although these two mechanisms are intertwined, they are typically studied in isolation. Here, we introduce a mathematical framework that allows us to explore both kinds of reciprocity simultaneously. We show that the well-known ‘generous tit-for-tat’ strategy of direct reciprocity has a natural analogue in indirect reciprocity, which we call ‘generous scoring’. Using an equilibrium analysis, we characterize under which conditions either of the two strategies can maintain cooperation. With simulations, we additionally explore which kind of reciprocity evolves when members of a population engage in social learning to adapt to their environment. Our results draw unexpected connections between direct and indirect reciprocity while highlighting important differences regarding their evolvability. AU - Schmid, Laura AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Hilbe, Christian AU - Nowak, Martin A. ID - 9402 IS - 10 JF - Nature Human Behaviour TI - A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity VL - 5 ER - TY - CONF AB - The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a well-established game-theoretic concept to shed light on coordination issues arising in open distributed systems. Leaving agents to selfishly optimize comes with the risk of ending up in sub-optimal states (in terms of performance and/or costs), compared to a centralized system design. However, the PoA relies on strong assumptions about agents' rationality (e.g., resources and information) and interactions, whereas in many distributed systems agents interact locally with bounded resources. They do so repeatedly over time (in contrast to "one-shot games"), and their strategies may evolve. Using a more realistic evolutionary game model, this paper introduces a realized evolutionary Price of Anarchy (ePoA). The ePoA allows an exploration of equilibrium selection in dynamic distributed systems with multiple equilibria, based on local interactions of simple memoryless agents. Considering a fundamental game related to virus propagation on networks, we present analytical bounds on the ePoA in basic network topologies and for different strategy update dynamics. In particular, deriving stationary distributions of the stochastic evolutionary process, we find that the Nash equilibria are not always the most abundant states, and that different processes can feature significant off-equilibrium behavior, leading to a significantly higher ePoA compared to the PoA studied traditionally in the literature. AU - Schmid, Laura AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Schmid, Stefan ID - 7346 T2 - Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems TI - The evolutionary price of anarchy: Locally bounded agents in a dynamic virus game VL - 153 ER - TY - CONF AB - A vector addition system with states (VASS) consists of a finite set of states and counters. A transition changes the current state to the next state, and every counter is either incremented, or decremented, or left unchanged. A state and value for each counter is a configuration; and a computation is an infinite sequence of configurations with transitions between successive configurations. A probabilistic VASS consists of a VASS along with a probability distribution over the transitions for each state. Qualitative properties such as state and configuration reachability have been widely studied for VASS. In this work we consider multi-dimensional long-run average objectives for VASS and probabilistic VASS. For a counter, the cost of a configuration is the value of the counter; and the long-run average value of a computation for the counter is the long-run average of the costs of the configurations in the computation. The multi-dimensional long-run average problem given a VASS and a threshold value for each counter, asks whether there is a computation such that for each counter the long-run average value for the counter does not exceed the respective threshold. For probabilistic VASS, instead of the existence of a computation, we consider whether the expected long-run average value for each counter does not exceed the respective threshold. Our main results are as follows: we show that the multi-dimensional long-run average problem (a) is NP-complete for integer-valued VASS; (b) is undecidable for natural-valued VASS (i.e., nonnegative counters); and (c) can be solved in polynomial time for probabilistic integer-valued VASS, and probabilistic natural-valued VASS when all computations are non-terminating. AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Henzinger, Thomas A AU - Otop, Jan ID - 8600 SN - 18688969 T2 - 31st International Conference on Concurrency Theory TI - Multi-dimensional long-run average problems for vector addition systems with states VL - 171 ER - TY - CONF AB - Game of Life is a simple and elegant model to study dynamical system over networks. The model consists of a graph where every vertex has one of two types, namely, dead or alive. A configuration is a mapping of the vertices to the types. An update rule describes how the type of a vertex is updated given the types of its neighbors. In every round, all vertices are updated synchronously, which leads to a configuration update. While in general, Game of Life allows a broad range of update rules, we focus on two simple families of update rules, namely, underpopulation and overpopulation, that model several interesting dynamics studied in the literature. In both settings, a dead vertex requires at least a desired number of live neighbors to become alive. For underpopulation (resp., overpopulation), a live vertex requires at least (resp. at most) a desired number of live neighbors to remain alive. We study the basic computation problems, e.g., configuration reachability, for these two families of rules. For underpopulation rules, we show that these problems can be solved in polynomial time, whereas for overpopulation rules they are PSPACE-complete. AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus AU - Jecker, Ismael R AU - Svoboda, Jakub ID - 8533 SN - 18688969 T2 - 45th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science TI - Simplified game of life: Algorithms and complexity VL - 170 ER - TY - CONF AB - A regular language L of finite words is composite if there are regular languages L₁,L₂,…,L_t such that L = ⋂_{i = 1}^t L_i and the index (number of states in a minimal DFA) of every language L_i is strictly smaller than the index of L. Otherwise, L is prime. Primality of regular languages was introduced and studied in [O. Kupferman and J. Mosheiff, 2015], where the complexity of deciding the primality of the language of a given DFA was left open, with a doubly-exponential gap between the upper and lower bounds. We study primality for unary regular languages, namely regular languages with a singleton alphabet. A unary language corresponds to a subset of ℕ, making the study of unary prime languages closer to that of primality in number theory. We show that the setting of languages is richer. In particular, while every composite number is the product of two smaller numbers, the number t of languages necessary to decompose a composite unary language induces a strict hierarchy. In addition, a primality witness for a unary language L, namely a word that is not in L but is in all products of languages that contain L and have an index smaller than L’s, may be of exponential length. Still, we are able to characterize compositionality by structural properties of a DFA for L, leading to a LogSpace algorithm for primality checking of unary DFAs. AU - Jecker, Ismael R AU - Kupferman, Orna AU - Mazzocchi, Nicolas ID - 8534 SN - 18688969 T2 - 45th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science TI - Unary prime languages VL - 170 ER -