TY - GEN AB - We consider two-player partial-observation stochastic games where player 1 has partial observation and player 2 has perfect observation. The winning condition we study are omega-regular conditions specified as parity objectives. The qualitative analysis problem given a partial-observation stochastic game and a parity objective asks whether there is a strategy to ensure that the objective is satisfied with probability 1 (resp. positive probability). While the qualitative analysis problems are known to be undecidable even for very special cases of parity objectives, they were shown to be decidable in 2EXPTIME under finite-memory strategies. We improve the complexity and show that the qualitative analysis problems for partial-observation stochastic parity games under finite-memory strategies are EXPTIME-complete; and also establish optimal (exponential) memory bounds for finite-memory strategies required for qualitative analysis. AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Doyen, Laurent AU - Nain, Sumit AU - Vardi, Moshe ID - 5408 SN - 2664-1690 TI - The complexity of partial-observation stochastic parity games with finite-memory strategies ER - TY - GEN AB - Board games, like Tic-Tac-Toe and CONNECT-4, play an important role not only in development of mathematical and logical skills, but also in emotional and social development. In this paper, we address the problem of generating targeted starting positions for such games. This can facilitate new approaches for bringing novice players to mastery, and also leads to discovery of interesting game variants. Our approach generates starting states of varying hardness levels for player 1 in a two-player board game, given rules of the board game, the desired number of steps required for player 1 to win, and the expertise levels of the two players. Our approach leverages symbolic methods and iterative simulation to efficiently search the extremely large state space. We present experimental results that include discovery of states of varying hardness levels for several simple grid-based board games. Also, the presence of such states for standard game variants like Tic-Tac-Toe on board size 4x4 opens up new games to be played that have not been played for ages since the default start state is heavily biased. AU - Ahmed, Umair AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Gulwani, Sumit ID - 5410 SN - 2664-1690 TI - Automatic generation of alternative starting positions for traditional board games ER - TY - CONF AB - Two-player games on graphs are central in many problems in formal verification and program analysis such as synthesis and verification of open systems. In this work, we consider both finite-state game graphs, and recursive game graphs (or pushdown game graphs) that model the control flow of sequential programs with recursion. The objectives we study are multidimensional mean-payoff objectives, where the goal of player 1 is to ensure that the mean-payoff is non-negative in all dimensions. In pushdown games two types of strategies are relevant: (1) global strategies, that depend on the entire global history; and (2) modular strategies, that have only local memory and thus do not depend on the context of invocation. Our main contributions are as follows: (1) We show that finite-state multidimensional mean-payoff games can be solved in polynomial time if the number of dimensions and the maximal absolute value of the weights are fixed; whereas if the number of dimensions is arbitrary, then the problem is known to be coNP-complete. (2) We show that pushdown graphs with multidimensional mean-payoff objectives can be solved in polynomial time. For both (1) and (2) our algorithms are based on hyperplane separation technique. (3) For pushdown games under global strategies both one and multidimensional mean-payoff objectives problems are known to be undecidable, and we show that under modular strategies the multidimensional problem is also undecidable; under modular strategies the one-dimensional problem is NP-complete. We show that if the number of modules, the number of exits, and the maximal absolute value of the weights are fixed, then pushdown games under modular strategies with one-dimensional mean-payoff objectives can be solved in polynomial time, and if either the number of exits or the number of modules is unbounded, then the problem is NP-hard. (4) Finally we show that a fixed parameter tractable algorithm for finite-state multidimensional mean-payoff games or pushdown games under modular strategies with one-dimensional mean-payoff objectives would imply the fixed parameter tractability of parity games. AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Velner, Yaron ID - 2329 TI - Hyperplane separation technique for multidimensional mean-payoff games VL - 8052 ER - TY - GEN AB - Cooperative behavior, where one individual incurs a cost to help another, is a wide spread phenomenon. Here we study direct reciprocity in the context of the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma. We consider all strategies that can be implemented by one and two-state automata. We calculate the payoff matrix of all pairwise encounters in the presence of noise. We explore deterministic selection dynamics with and without mutation. Using different error rates and payoff values, we observe convergence to a small number of distinct equilibria. Two of them are uncooperative strict Nash equilibria representing always-defect (ALLD) and Grim. The third equilibrium is mixed and represents a cooperative alliance of several strategies, dominated by a strategy which we call Forgiver. Forgiver cooperates whenever the opponent has cooperated; it defects once when the opponent has defected, but subsequently Forgiver attempts to re-establish cooperation even if the opponent has defected again. Forgiver is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, but the alliance, which it rules, is asymptotically stable. For a wide range of parameter values the most commonly observed outcome is convergence to the mixed equilibrium, dominated by Forgiver. Our results show that although forgiving might incur a short-term loss it can lead to a long-term gain. Forgiveness facilitates stable cooperation in the presence of exploitation and noise. AU - Zagorsky, Benjamin AU - Reiter, Johannes AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Nowak, Martin ID - 9749 TI - Forgiver triumphs in alternating prisoner's dilemma ER - TY - CONF AB - We consider how to edit strings from a source language so that the edited strings belong to a target language, where the languages are given as deterministic finite automata. Non-streaming (or offline) transducers perform edits given the whole source string. We show that the class of deterministic one-pass transducers with registers along with increment and min operation suffices for computing optimal edit distance, whereas the same class of transducers without the min operation is not sufficient. Streaming (or online) transducers perform edits as the letters of the source string are received. We present a polynomial time algorithm for the partial-repair problem that given a bound α asks for the construction of a deterministic streaming transducer (if one exists) that ensures that the ‘maximum fraction’ η of the strings of the source language are edited, within cost α, to the target language. AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Chaubal, Siddhesh AU - Rubin, Sasha ID - 10902 SN - 0302-9743 T2 - 7th International Conference on Language and Automata Theory and Applications TI - How to travel between languages VL - 7810 ER - TY - JOUR AB - Cooperative behavior, where one individual incurs a cost to help another, is a wide spread phenomenon. Here we study direct reciprocity in the context of the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma. We consider all strategies that can be implemented by one and two-state automata. We calculate the payoff matrix of all pairwise encounters in the presence of noise. We explore deterministic selection dynamics with and without mutation. Using different error rates and payoff values, we observe convergence to a small number of distinct equilibria. Two of them are uncooperative strict Nash equilibria representing always-defect (ALLD) and Grim. The third equilibrium is mixed and represents a cooperative alliance of several strategies, dominated by a strategy which we call Forgiver. Forgiver cooperates whenever the opponent has cooperated; it defects once when the opponent has defected, but subsequently Forgiver attempts to re-establish cooperation even if the opponent has defected again. Forgiver is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, but the alliance, which it rules, is asymptotically stable. For a wide range of parameter values the most commonly observed outcome is convergence to the mixed equilibrium, dominated by Forgiver. Our results show that although forgiving might incur a short-term loss it can lead to a long-term gain. Forgiveness facilitates stable cooperation in the presence of exploitation and noise. AU - Zagorsky, Benjamin AU - Reiter, Johannes AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Nowak, Martin ID - 2247 IS - 12 JF - PLoS One TI - Forgiver triumphs in alternating prisoner's dilemma VL - 8 ER - TY - JOUR AB - Tumor growth is caused by the acquisition of driver mutations, which enhance the net reproductive rate of cells. Driver mutations may increase cell division, reduce cell death, or allow cells to overcome density-limiting effects. We study the dynamics of tumor growth as one additional driver mutation is acquired. Our models are based on two-type branching processes that terminate in either tumor disappearance or tumor detection. In our first model, both cell types grow exponentially, with a faster rate for cells carrying the additional driver. We find that the additional driver mutation does not affect the survival probability of the lesion, but can substantially reduce the time to reach the detectable size if the lesion is slow growing. In our second model, cells lacking the additional driver cannot exceed a fixed carrying capacity, due to density limitations. In this case, the time to detection depends strongly on this carrying capacity. Our model provides a quantitative framework for studying tumor dynamics during different stages of progression. We observe that early, small lesions need additional drivers, while late stage metastases are only marginally affected by them. These results help to explain why additional driver mutations are typically not detected in fast-growing metastases. AU - Reiter, Johannes AU - Božić, Ivana AU - Allen, Benjamin AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Nowak, Martin ID - 2858 IS - 1 JF - Evolutionary Applications TI - The effect of one additional driver mutation on tumor progression VL - 6 ER - TY - JOUR AB - In solid tumors, targeted treatments can lead to dramatic regressions, but responses are often short-lived because resistant cancer cells arise. The major strategy proposed for overcoming resistance is combination therapy. We present a mathematical model describing the evolutionary dynamics of lesions in response to treatment. We first studied 20 melanoma patients receiving vemurafenib. We then applied our model to an independent set of pancreatic, colorectal, and melanoma cancer patients with metastatic disease. We find that dual therapy results in long-term disease control for most patients, if there are no single mutations that cause cross-resistance to both drugs; in patients with large disease burden, triple therapy is needed. We also find that simultaneous therapy with two drugs is much more effective than sequential therapy. Our results provide realistic expectations for the efficacy of new drug combinations and inform the design of trials for new cancer therapeutics. AU - Božić, Ivana AU - Reiter, Johannes AU - Allen, Benjamin AU - Antal, Tibor AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Shah, Preya AU - Moon, Yo AU - Yaqubie, Amin AU - Kelly, Nicole AU - Le, Dung AU - Lipson, Evan AU - Chapman, Paul AU - Diaz, Luis AU - Vogelstein, Bert AU - Nowak, Martin ID - 2816 JF - eLife TI - Evolutionary dynamics of cancer in response to targeted combination therapy VL - 2 ER - TY - CONF AB - In this work we present a flexible tool for tumor progression, which simulates the evolutionary dynamics of cancer. Tumor progression implements a multi-type branching process where the key parameters are the fitness landscape, the mutation rate, and the average time of cell division. The fitness of a cancer cell depends on the mutations it has accumulated. The input to our tool could be any fitness landscape, mutation rate, and cell division time, and the tool produces the growth dynamics and all relevant statistics. AU - Reiter, Johannes AU - Božić, Ivana AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Nowak, Martin ID - 2000 T2 - Proceedings of 25th Int. Conf. on Computer Aided Verification TI - TTP: Tool for tumor progression VL - 8044 ER - TY - CONF AB - We study the complexity of central controller synthesis problems for finite-state Markov decision processes, where the objective is to optimize both the expected mean-payoff performance of the system and its stability. e argue that the basic theoretical notion of expressing the stability in terms of the variance of the mean-payoff (called global variance in our paper) is not always sufficient, since it ignores possible instabilities on respective runs. For this reason we propose alernative definitions of stability, which we call local and hybrid variance, and which express how rewards on each run deviate from the run's own mean-payoff and from the expected mean-payoff, respectively. We show that a strategy ensuring both the expected mean-payoff and the variance below given bounds requires randomization and memory, under all the above semantics of variance. We then look at the problem of determining whether there is a such a strategy. For the global variance, we show that the problem is in PSPACE, and that the answer can be approximated in pseudo-polynomial time. For the hybrid variance, the analogous decision problem is in NP, and a polynomial-time approximating algorithm also exists. For local variance, we show that the decision problem is in NP. Since the overall performance can be traded for stability (and vice versa), we also present algorithms for approximating the associated Pareto curve in all the three cases. Finally, we study a special case of the decision problems, where we require a given expected mean-payoff together with zero variance. Here we show that the problems can be all solved in polynomial time. AU - Brázdil, Tomáš AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Forejt, Vojtěch AU - Kučera, Antonín ID - 2305 T2 - 28th Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium TI - Trading performance for stability in Markov decision processes ER -