@inproceedings{9987, abstract = {Stateless model checking (SMC) is one of the standard approaches to the verification of concurrent programs. As scheduling non-determinism creates exponentially large spaces of thread interleavings, SMC attempts to partition this space into equivalence classes and explore only a few representatives from each class. The efficiency of this approach depends on two factors: (a) the coarseness of the partitioning, and (b) the time to generate representatives in each class. For this reason, the search for coarse partitionings that are efficiently explorable is an active research challenge. In this work we present RVF-SMC , a new SMC algorithm that uses a novel reads-value-from (RVF) partitioning. Intuitively, two interleavings are deemed equivalent if they agree on the value obtained in each read event, and read events induce consistent causal orderings between them. The RVF partitioning is provably coarser than recent approaches based on Mazurkiewicz and “reads-from” partitionings. Our experimental evaluation reveals that RVF is quite often a very effective equivalence, as the underlying partitioning is exponentially coarser than other approaches. Moreover, RVF-SMC generates representatives very efficiently, as the reduction in the partitioning is often met with significant speed-ups in the model checking task.}, author = {Agarwal, Pratyush and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Pathak, Shreya and Pavlogiannis, Andreas and Toman, Viktor}, booktitle = {33rd International Conference on Computer-Aided Verification }, isbn = {978-3-030-81684-1}, issn = {1611-3349}, location = {Virtual}, pages = {341--366}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, title = {{Stateless model checking under a reads-value-from equivalence}}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-81685-8_16}, volume = {12759 }, year = {2021}, } @article{10191, abstract = {In this work we solve the algorithmic problem of consistency verification for the TSO and PSO memory models given a reads-from map, denoted VTSO-rf and VPSO-rf, respectively. For an execution of n events over k threads and d variables, we establish novel bounds that scale as nk+1 for TSO and as nk+1· min(nk2, 2k· d) for PSO. Moreover, based on our solution to these problems, we develop an SMC algorithm under TSO and PSO that uses the RF equivalence. The algorithm is exploration-optimal, in the sense that it is guaranteed to explore each class of the RF partitioning exactly once, and spends polynomial time per class when k is bounded. Finally, we implement all our algorithms in the SMC tool Nidhugg, and perform a large number of experiments over benchmarks from existing literature. Our experimental results show that our algorithms for VTSO-rf and VPSO-rf provide significant scalability improvements over standard alternatives. Moreover, when used for SMC, the RF partitioning is often much coarser than the standard Shasha-Snir partitioning for TSO/PSO, which yields a significant speedup in the model checking task. }, author = {Bui, Truc Lam and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Gautam, Tushar and Pavlogiannis, Andreas and Toman, Viktor}, issn = {2475-1421}, journal = {Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages}, keywords = {safety, risk, reliability and quality, software}, number = {OOPSLA}, publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery}, title = {{The reads-from equivalence for the TSO and PSO memory models}}, doi = {10.1145/3485541}, volume = {5}, year = {2021}, } @phdthesis{10199, abstract = {The design and verification of concurrent systems remains an open challenge due to the non-determinism that arises from the inter-process communication. In particular, concurrent programs are notoriously difficult both to be written correctly and to be analyzed formally, as complex thread interaction has to be accounted for. The difficulties are further exacerbated when concurrent programs get executed on modern-day hardware, which contains various buffering and caching mechanisms for efficiency reasons. This causes further subtle non-determinism, which can often produce very unintuitive behavior of the concurrent programs. Model checking is at the forefront of tackling the verification problem, where the task is to decide, given as input a concurrent system and a desired property, whether the system satisfies the property. The inherent state-space explosion problem in model checking of concurrent systems causes naïve explicit methods not to scale, thus more inventive methods are required. One such method is stateless model checking (SMC), which explores in memory-efficient manner the program executions rather than the states of the program. State-of-the-art SMC is typically coupled with partial order reduction (POR) techniques, which argue that certain executions provably produce identical system behavior, thus limiting the amount of executions one needs to explore in order to cover all possible behaviors. Another method to tackle the state-space explosion is symbolic model checking, where the considered techniques operate on a succinct implicit representation of the input system rather than explicitly accessing the system. In this thesis we present new techniques for verification of concurrent systems. We present several novel POR methods for SMC of concurrent programs under various models of semantics, some of which account for write-buffering mechanisms. Additionally, we present novel algorithms for symbolic model checking of finite-state concurrent systems, where the desired property of the systems is to ensure a formally defined notion of fairness.}, author = {Toman, Viktor}, issn = {2663-337X}, keywords = {concurrency, verification, model checking}, pages = {166}, publisher = {Institute of Science and Technology Austria}, title = {{Improved verification techniques for concurrent systems}}, doi = {10.15479/at:ista:10199}, year = {2021}, } @article{9293, abstract = {We consider planning problems for graphs, Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), and games on graphs in an explicit state space. While graphs represent the most basic planning model, MDPs represent interaction with nature and games on graphs represent interaction with an adversarial environment. We consider two planning problems with k different target sets: (a) the coverage problem asks whether there is a plan for each individual target set; and (b) the sequential target reachability problem asks whether the targets can be reached in a given sequence. For the coverage problem, we present a linear-time algorithm for graphs, and quadratic conditional lower bound for MDPs and games on graphs. For the sequential target problem, we present a linear-time algorithm for graphs, a sub-quadratic algorithm for MDPs, and a quadratic conditional lower bound for games on graphs. Our results with conditional lower bounds, based on the boolean matrix multiplication (BMM) conjecture and strong exponential time hypothesis (SETH), establish (i) model-separation results showing that for the coverage problem MDPs and games on graphs are harder than graphs, and for the sequential reachability problem games on graphs are harder than MDPs and graphs; and (ii) problem-separation results showing that for MDPs the coverage problem is harder than the sequential target problem.}, author = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Dvořák, Wolfgang and Henzinger, Monika H and Svozil, Alexander}, issn = {0004-3702}, journal = {Artificial Intelligence}, number = {8}, publisher = {Elsevier}, title = {{Algorithms and conditional lower bounds for planning problems}}, doi = {10.1016/j.artint.2021.103499}, volume = {297}, year = {2021}, } @article{9393, abstract = {We consider the core algorithmic problems related to verification of systems with respect to three classical quantitative properties, namely, the mean-payoff, the ratio, and the minimum initial credit for energy property. The algorithmic problem given a graph and a quantitative property asks to compute the optimal value (the infimum value over all traces) from every node of the graph. We consider graphs with bounded treewidth—a class that contains the control flow graphs of most programs. Let n denote the number of nodes of a graph, m the number of edges (for bounded treewidth 𝑚=𝑂(𝑛)) and W the largest absolute value of the weights. Our main theoretical results are as follows. First, for the minimum initial credit problem we show that (1) for general graphs the problem can be solved in 𝑂(𝑛2⋅𝑚) time and the associated decision problem in 𝑂(𝑛⋅𝑚) time, improving the previous known 𝑂(𝑛3⋅𝑚⋅log(𝑛⋅𝑊)) and 𝑂(𝑛2⋅𝑚) bounds, respectively; and (2) for bounded treewidth graphs we present an algorithm that requires 𝑂(𝑛⋅log𝑛) time. Second, for bounded treewidth graphs we present an algorithm that approximates the mean-payoff value within a factor of 1+𝜖 in time 𝑂(𝑛⋅log(𝑛/𝜖)) as compared to the classical exact algorithms on general graphs that require quadratic time. Third, for the ratio property we present an algorithm that for bounded treewidth graphs works in time 𝑂(𝑛⋅log(|𝑎⋅𝑏|))=𝑂(𝑛⋅log(𝑛⋅𝑊)), when the output is 𝑎𝑏, as compared to the previously best known algorithm on general graphs with running time 𝑂(𝑛2⋅log(𝑛⋅𝑊)). We have implemented some of our algorithms and show that they present a significant speedup on standard benchmarks.}, author = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus and Pavlogiannis, Andreas}, issn = {1572-8102}, journal = {Formal Methods in System Design}, pages = {401--428}, publisher = {Springer}, title = {{Faster algorithms for quantitative verification in bounded treewidth graphs}}, doi = {10.1007/s10703-021-00373-5}, volume = {57}, year = {2021}, } @inproceedings{9644, abstract = {We present a new approach to proving non-termination of non-deterministic integer programs. Our technique is rather simple but efficient. It relies on a purely syntactic reversal of the program's transition system followed by a constraint-based invariant synthesis with constraints coming from both the original and the reversed transition system. The latter task is performed by a simple call to an off-the-shelf SMT-solver, which allows us to leverage the latest advances in SMT-solving. Moreover, our method offers a combination of features not present (as a whole) in previous approaches: it handles programs with non-determinism, provides relative completeness guarantees and supports programs with polynomial arithmetic. The experiments performed with our prototype tool RevTerm show that our approach, despite its simplicity and stronger theoretical guarantees, is at least on par with the state-of-the-art tools, often achieving a non-trivial improvement under a proper configuration of its parameters.}, author = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Goharshady, Ehsan Kafshdar and Novotný, Petr and Zikelic, Dorde}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 42nd ACM SIGPLAN International Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation}, isbn = {9781450383912}, location = {Online}, pages = {1033--1048}, publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery}, title = {{Proving non-termination by program reversal}}, doi = {10.1145/3453483.3454093}, year = {2021}, } @inproceedings{10414, abstract = {We consider the almost-sure (a.s.) termination problem for probabilistic programs, which are a stochastic extension of classical imperative programs. Lexicographic ranking functions provide a sound and practical approach for termination of non-probabilistic programs, and their extension to probabilistic programs is achieved via lexicographic ranking supermartingales (LexRSMs). However, LexRSMs introduced in the previous work have a limitation that impedes their automation: all of their components have to be non-negative in all reachable states. This might result in LexRSM not existing even for simple terminating programs. Our contributions are twofold: First, we introduce a generalization of LexRSMs which allows for some components to be negative. This standard feature of non-probabilistic termination proofs was hitherto not known to be sound in the probabilistic setting, as the soundness proof requires a careful analysis of the underlying stochastic process. Second, we present polynomial-time algorithms using our generalized LexRSMs for proving a.s. termination in broad classes of linear-arithmetic programs.}, author = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Goharshady, Ehsan Kafshdar and Novotný, Petr and Zárevúcky, Jiří and Zikelic, Dorde}, booktitle = {24th International Symposium on Formal Methods}, isbn = {9-783-0309-0869-0}, issn = {1611-3349}, location = {Virtual}, pages = {619--639}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, title = {{On lexicographic proof rules for probabilistic termination}}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-90870-6_33}, volume = {13047}, year = {2021}, } @phdthesis{8934, abstract = {In this thesis, we consider several of the most classical and fundamental problems in static analysis and formal verification, including invariant generation, reachability analysis, termination analysis of probabilistic programs, data-flow analysis, quantitative analysis of Markov chains and Markov decision processes, and the problem of data packing in cache management. We use techniques from parameterized complexity theory, polyhedral geometry, and real algebraic geometry to significantly improve the state-of-the-art, in terms of both scalability and completeness guarantees, for the mentioned problems. In some cases, our results are the first theoretical improvements for the respective problems in two or three decades.}, author = {Goharshady, Amir Kafshdar}, issn = {2663-337X}, pages = {278}, publisher = {Institute of Science and Technology Austria}, title = {{Parameterized and algebro-geometric advances in static program analysis}}, doi = {10.15479/AT:ISTA:8934}, year = {2021}, } @phdthesis{10293, abstract = {Indirect reciprocity in evolutionary game theory is a prominent mechanism for explaining the evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals. In contrast to direct reciprocity, which is based on individuals meeting repeatedly, and conditionally cooperating by using their own experiences, indirect reciprocity is based on individuals’ reputations. If a player helps another, this increases the helper’s public standing, benefitting them in the future. This lets cooperation in the population emerge without individuals having to meet more than once. While the two modes of reciprocity are intertwined, they are difficult to compare. Thus, they are usually studied in isolation. Direct reciprocity can maintain cooperation with simple strategies, and is robust against noise even when players do not remember more than their partner’s last action. Meanwhile, indirect reciprocity requires its successful strategies, or social norms, to be more complex. Exhaustive search previously identified eight such norms, called the “leading eight”, which excel at maintaining cooperation. However, as the first result of this thesis, we show that the leading eight break down once we remove the fundamental assumption that information is synchronized and public, such that everyone agrees on reputations. Once we consider a more realistic scenario of imperfect information, where reputations are private, and individuals occasionally misinterpret or miss observations, the leading eight do not promote cooperation anymore. Instead, minor initial disagreements can proliferate, fragmenting populations into subgroups. In a next step, we consider ways to mitigate this issue. We first explore whether introducing “generosity” can stabilize cooperation when players use the leading eight strategies in noisy environments. This approach of modifying strategies to include probabilistic elements for coping with errors is known to work well in direct reciprocity. However, as we show here, it fails for the more complex norms of indirect reciprocity. Imperfect information still prevents cooperation from evolving. On the other hand, we succeeded to show in this thesis that modifying the leading eight to use “quantitative assessment”, i.e. tracking reputation scores on a scale beyond good and bad, and making overall judgments of others based on a threshold, is highly successful, even when noise increases in the environment. Cooperation can flourish when reputations are more nuanced, and players have a broader understanding what it means to be “good.” Finally, we present a single theoretical framework that unites the two modes of reciprocity despite their differences. Within this framework, we identify a novel simple and successful strategy for indirect reciprocity, which can cope with noisy environments and has an analogue in direct reciprocity. We can also analyze decision making when different sources of information are available. Our results help highlight that for sustaining cooperation, already the most simple rules of reciprocity can be sufficient.}, author = {Schmid, Laura}, issn = {2663-337X}, pages = {171}, publisher = {Institute of Science and Technology Austria}, title = {{Evolution of cooperation via (in)direct reciprocity under imperfect information}}, doi = {10.15479/at:ista:10293}, year = {2021}, } @article{9997, abstract = {Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on social norms. This mechanism requires that individuals in a population observe and judge each other’s behaviors. Individuals with a good reputation are more likely to receive help from others. Previous work suggests that indirect reciprocity is only effective when all relevant information is reliable and publicly available. Otherwise, individuals may disagree on how to assess others, even if they all apply the same social norm. Such disagreements can lead to a breakdown of cooperation. Here we explore whether the predominantly studied ‘leading eight’ social norms of indirect reciprocity can be made more robust by equipping them with an element of generosity. To this end, we distinguish between two kinds of generosity. According to assessment generosity, individuals occasionally assign a good reputation to group members who would usually be regarded as bad. According to action generosity, individuals occasionally cooperate with group members with whom they would usually defect. Using individual-based simulations, we show that the two kinds of generosity have a very different effect on the resulting reputation dynamics. Assessment generosity tends to add to the overall noise and allows defectors to invade. In contrast, a limited amount of action generosity can be beneficial in a few cases. However, even when action generosity is beneficial, the respective simulations do not result in full cooperation. Our results suggest that while generosity can favor cooperation when individuals use the most simple strategies of reciprocity, it is disadvantageous when individuals use more complex social norms.}, author = {Schmid, Laura and Shati, Pouya and Hilbe, Christian and Chatterjee, Krishnendu}, issn = {2045-2322}, journal = {Scientific Reports}, keywords = {Multidisciplinary}, number = {1}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, title = {{The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity}}, doi = {10.1038/s41598-021-96932-1}, volume = {11}, year = {2021}, } @article{9402, abstract = {Direct and indirect reciprocity are key mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Direct reciprocity means that individuals use their own experience to decide whether to cooperate with another person. Indirect reciprocity means that they also consider the experiences of others. Although these two mechanisms are intertwined, they are typically studied in isolation. Here, we introduce a mathematical framework that allows us to explore both kinds of reciprocity simultaneously. We show that the well-known ‘generous tit-for-tat’ strategy of direct reciprocity has a natural analogue in indirect reciprocity, which we call ‘generous scoring’. Using an equilibrium analysis, we characterize under which conditions either of the two strategies can maintain cooperation. With simulations, we additionally explore which kind of reciprocity evolves when members of a population engage in social learning to adapt to their environment. Our results draw unexpected connections between direct and indirect reciprocity while highlighting important differences regarding their evolvability.}, author = {Schmid, Laura and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Hilbe, Christian and Nowak, Martin A.}, issn = {2397-3374}, journal = {Nature Human Behaviour}, number = {10}, pages = {1292–1302}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, title = {{A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity}}, doi = {10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8}, volume = {5}, year = {2021}, } @inproceedings{7346, abstract = {The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a well-established game-theoretic concept to shed light on coordination issues arising in open distributed systems. Leaving agents to selfishly optimize comes with the risk of ending up in sub-optimal states (in terms of performance and/or costs), compared to a centralized system design. However, the PoA relies on strong assumptions about agents' rationality (e.g., resources and information) and interactions, whereas in many distributed systems agents interact locally with bounded resources. They do so repeatedly over time (in contrast to "one-shot games"), and their strategies may evolve. Using a more realistic evolutionary game model, this paper introduces a realized evolutionary Price of Anarchy (ePoA). The ePoA allows an exploration of equilibrium selection in dynamic distributed systems with multiple equilibria, based on local interactions of simple memoryless agents. Considering a fundamental game related to virus propagation on networks, we present analytical bounds on the ePoA in basic network topologies and for different strategy update dynamics. In particular, deriving stationary distributions of the stochastic evolutionary process, we find that the Nash equilibria are not always the most abundant states, and that different processes can feature significant off-equilibrium behavior, leading to a significantly higher ePoA compared to the PoA studied traditionally in the literature. }, author = {Schmid, Laura and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Schmid, Stefan}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems}, location = {Neuchâtel, Switzerland}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik}, title = {{The evolutionary price of anarchy: Locally bounded agents in a dynamic virus game}}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2019.21}, volume = {153}, year = {2020}, } @inproceedings{8600, abstract = {A vector addition system with states (VASS) consists of a finite set of states and counters. A transition changes the current state to the next state, and every counter is either incremented, or decremented, or left unchanged. A state and value for each counter is a configuration; and a computation is an infinite sequence of configurations with transitions between successive configurations. A probabilistic VASS consists of a VASS along with a probability distribution over the transitions for each state. Qualitative properties such as state and configuration reachability have been widely studied for VASS. In this work we consider multi-dimensional long-run average objectives for VASS and probabilistic VASS. For a counter, the cost of a configuration is the value of the counter; and the long-run average value of a computation for the counter is the long-run average of the costs of the configurations in the computation. The multi-dimensional long-run average problem given a VASS and a threshold value for each counter, asks whether there is a computation such that for each counter the long-run average value for the counter does not exceed the respective threshold. For probabilistic VASS, instead of the existence of a computation, we consider whether the expected long-run average value for each counter does not exceed the respective threshold. Our main results are as follows: we show that the multi-dimensional long-run average problem (a) is NP-complete for integer-valued VASS; (b) is undecidable for natural-valued VASS (i.e., nonnegative counters); and (c) can be solved in polynomial time for probabilistic integer-valued VASS, and probabilistic natural-valued VASS when all computations are non-terminating.}, author = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Henzinger, Thomas A and Otop, Jan}, booktitle = {31st International Conference on Concurrency Theory}, isbn = {9783959771603}, issn = {18688969}, location = {Virtual}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik}, title = {{Multi-dimensional long-run average problems for vector addition systems with states}}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2020.23}, volume = {171}, year = {2020}, } @inproceedings{8533, abstract = {Game of Life is a simple and elegant model to study dynamical system over networks. The model consists of a graph where every vertex has one of two types, namely, dead or alive. A configuration is a mapping of the vertices to the types. An update rule describes how the type of a vertex is updated given the types of its neighbors. In every round, all vertices are updated synchronously, which leads to a configuration update. While in general, Game of Life allows a broad range of update rules, we focus on two simple families of update rules, namely, underpopulation and overpopulation, that model several interesting dynamics studied in the literature. In both settings, a dead vertex requires at least a desired number of live neighbors to become alive. For underpopulation (resp., overpopulation), a live vertex requires at least (resp. at most) a desired number of live neighbors to remain alive. We study the basic computation problems, e.g., configuration reachability, for these two families of rules. For underpopulation rules, we show that these problems can be solved in polynomial time, whereas for overpopulation rules they are PSPACE-complete.}, author = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus and Jecker, Ismael R and Svoboda, Jakub}, booktitle = {45th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science}, isbn = {9783959771597}, issn = {18688969}, location = {Prague, Czech Republic}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik}, title = {{Simplified game of life: Algorithms and complexity}}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2020.22}, volume = {170}, year = {2020}, } @inproceedings{8534, abstract = {A regular language L of finite words is composite if there are regular languages L₁,L₂,…,L_t such that L = ⋂_{i = 1}^t L_i and the index (number of states in a minimal DFA) of every language L_i is strictly smaller than the index of L. Otherwise, L is prime. Primality of regular languages was introduced and studied in [O. Kupferman and J. Mosheiff, 2015], where the complexity of deciding the primality of the language of a given DFA was left open, with a doubly-exponential gap between the upper and lower bounds. We study primality for unary regular languages, namely regular languages with a singleton alphabet. A unary language corresponds to a subset of ℕ, making the study of unary prime languages closer to that of primality in number theory. We show that the setting of languages is richer. In particular, while every composite number is the product of two smaller numbers, the number t of languages necessary to decompose a composite unary language induces a strict hierarchy. In addition, a primality witness for a unary language L, namely a word that is not in L but is in all products of languages that contain L and have an index smaller than L’s, may be of exponential length. Still, we are able to characterize compositionality by structural properties of a DFA for L, leading to a LogSpace algorithm for primality checking of unary DFAs.}, author = {Jecker, Ismael R and Kupferman, Orna and Mazzocchi, Nicolas}, booktitle = {45th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science}, isbn = {9783959771597}, issn = {18688969}, location = {Prague, Czech Republic}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik}, title = {{Unary prime languages}}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2020.51}, volume = {170}, year = {2020}, } @inproceedings{7955, abstract = {Simple stochastic games are turn-based 2½-player games with a reachability objective. The basic question asks whether one player can ensure reaching a given target with at least a given probability. A natural extension is games with a conjunction of such conditions as objective. Despite a plethora of recent results on the analysis of systems with multiple objectives, the decidability of this basic problem remains open. In this paper, we present an algorithm approximating the Pareto frontier of the achievable values to a given precision. Moreover, it is an anytime algorithm, meaning it can be stopped at any time returning the current approximation and its error bound.}, author = {Ashok, Pranav and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Kretinsky, Jan and Weininger, Maximilian and Winkler, Tobias}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 35th Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science }, isbn = {9781450371049}, location = {Saarbrücken, Germany}, pages = {102--115}, publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery}, title = {{Approximating values of generalized-reachability stochastic games}}, doi = {10.1145/3373718.3394761}, year = {2020}, } @article{8767, abstract = {Resources are rarely distributed uniformly within a population. Heterogeneity in the concentration of a drug, the quality of breeding sites, or wealth can all affect evolutionary dynamics. In this study, we represent a collection of properties affecting the fitness at a given location using a color. A green node is rich in resources while a red node is poorer. More colors can represent a broader spectrum of resource qualities. For a population evolving according to the birth-death Moran model, the first question we address is which structures, identified by graph connectivity and graph coloring, are evolutionarily equivalent. We prove that all properly two-colored, undirected, regular graphs are evolutionarily equivalent (where “properly colored” means that no two neighbors have the same color). We then compare the effects of background heterogeneity on properly two-colored graphs to those with alternative schemes in which the colors are permuted. Finally, we discuss dynamic coloring as a model for spatiotemporal resource fluctuations, and we illustrate that random dynamic colorings often diminish the effects of background heterogeneity relative to a proper two-coloring.}, author = {Kaveh, Kamran and McAvoy, Alex and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Nowak, Martin A.}, issn = {1553-7358}, journal = {PLOS Computational Biology}, keywords = {Ecology, Modelling and Simulation, Computational Theory and Mathematics, Genetics, Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics, Molecular Biology, Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience}, number = {11}, publisher = {Public Library of Science}, title = {{The Moran process on 2-chromatic graphs}}, doi = {10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008402}, volume = {16}, year = {2020}, } @article{8789, abstract = {Cooperation is a ubiquitous and beneficial behavioural trait despite being prone to exploitation by free-riders. Hence, cooperative populations are prone to invasions by selfish individuals. However, a population consisting of only free-riders typically does not survive. Thus, cooperators and free-riders often coexist in some proportion. An evolutionary version of a Snowdrift Game proved its efficiency in analysing this phenomenon. However, what if the system has already reached its stable state but was perturbed due to a change in environmental conditions? Then, individuals may have to re-learn their effective strategies. To address this, we consider behavioural mistakes in strategic choice execution, which we refer to as incompetence. Parametrising the propensity to make such mistakes allows for a mathematical description of learning. We compare strategies based on their relative strategic advantage relying on both fitness and learning factors. When strategies are learned at distinct rates, allowing learning according to a prescribed order is optimal. Interestingly, the strategy with the lowest strategic advantage should be learnt first if we are to optimise fitness over the learning path. Then, the differences between strategies are balanced out in order to minimise the effect of behavioural uncertainty.}, author = {Kleshnina, Maria and Streipert, Sabrina and Filar, Jerzy and Chatterjee, Krishnendu}, issn = {22277390}, journal = {Mathematics}, number = {11}, publisher = {MDPI}, title = {{Prioritised learning in snowdrift-type games}}, doi = {10.3390/math8111945}, volume = {8}, year = {2020}, } @article{8788, abstract = {We consider a real-time setting where an environment releases sequences of firm-deadline tasks, and an online scheduler chooses on-the-fly the ones to execute on a single processor so as to maximize cumulated utility. The competitive ratio is a well-known performance measure for the scheduler: it gives the worst-case ratio, among all possible choices for the environment, of the cumulated utility of the online scheduler versus an offline scheduler that knows these choices in advance. Traditionally, competitive analysis is performed by hand, while automated techniques are rare and only handle static environments with independent tasks. We present a quantitative-verification framework for precedence-aware competitive analysis, where task releases may depend on preceding scheduling choices, i.e., the environment can respond to scheduling decisions dynamically . We consider two general classes of precedences: 1) follower precedences force the release of a dependent task upon the completion of a set of precursor tasks, while and 2) pairing precedences modify the characteristics of a dependent task provided the completion of a set of precursor tasks. Precedences make competitive analysis challenging, as the online and offline schedulers operate on diverging sequences. We make a formal presentation of our framework, and use a GPU-based implementation to analyze ten well-known schedulers on precedence-based application examples taken from the existing literature: 1) a handshake protocol (HP); 2) network packet-switching; 3) query scheduling (QS); and 4) a sporadic-interrupt setting. Our experimental results show that precedences and task parameters can vary drastically the best scheduler. Our framework thus supports application designers in choosing the best scheduler among a given set automatically.}, author = {Pavlogiannis, Andreas and Schaumberger, Nico and Schmid, Ulrich and Chatterjee, Krishnendu}, issn = {19374151}, journal = {IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems}, number = {11}, pages = {3981--3992}, publisher = {IEEE}, title = {{Precedence-aware automated competitive analysis of real-time scheduling}}, doi = {10.1109/TCAD.2020.3012803}, volume = {39}, year = {2020}, } @article{9197, abstract = {In this paper we introduce and study all-pay bidding games, a class of two player, zero-sum games on graphs. The game proceeds as follows. We place a token on some vertex in the graph and assign budgets to the two players. Each turn, each player submits a sealed legal bid (non-negative and below their remaining budget), which is deducted from their budget and the highest bidder moves the token onto an adjacent vertex. The game ends once a sink is reached, and Player 1 pays Player 2 the outcome that is associated with the sink. The players attempt to maximize their expected outcome. Our games model settings where effort (of no inherent value) needs to be invested in an ongoing and stateful manner. On the negative side, we show that even in simple games on DAGs, optimal strategies may require a distribution over bids with infinite support. A central quantity in bidding games is the ratio of the players budgets. On the positive side, we show a simple FPTAS for DAGs, that, for each budget ratio, outputs an approximation for the optimal strategy for that ratio. We also implement it, show that it performs well, and suggests interesting properties of these games. Then, given an outcome c, we show an algorithm for finding the necessary and sufficient initial ratio for guaranteeing outcome c with probability 1 and a strategy ensuring such. Finally, while the general case has not previously been studied, solving the specific game in which Player 1 wins iff he wins the first two auctions, has been long stated as an open question, which we solve.}, author = {Avni, Guy and Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus and Tkadlec, Josef}, isbn = {9781577358350}, issn = {2374-3468}, journal = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence}, location = {New York, NY, United States}, number = {02}, pages = {1798--1805}, publisher = {Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence}, title = {{All-pay bidding games on graphs}}, doi = {10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5546}, volume = {34}, year = {2020}, }